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Onft of the problems of business facine the Hation
at the present time is that of the holding company in the
public utility field* It is one phase of the larger and
constant problem of the control of ”big business”*
It has been claimed that the holding company move-
ment in the utility field has not. been treated from the
economic viewpoint. Our economic and governmental con-
cepts are now in a state of flux. Q,uestions which are fund-
amentally economic have become political, not only because of
their nature, but by designing politicians. The problem has
become complicated because of the vast amount of literature
in the newspapers and magazines, consisting of propaganda by
both governmental and anti-governmental agencies*
To alleviate the confusion of the mind resulting from
the above conditions and to clarify the issues on this prob-
lem so intimately associated v/ith the public ownership and
power issues, it is necessary to make an impartial invest-
igation to determine what the problem is and how it is being
met*
The holding company movement in the public utility
field attracted my attention v/hile I was studying holding
companies in preparation for the examination set by the
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.Massachusetts Board of Registration of Certified Public
Accountants* When Professor 0*Neil of the faculty sug-
gested the subject, I was glad of the opportunity to fur-
ther my study of this aspect of the holding company prob-
lem, a subject which I have always desired to investigate
further and to bring my obeervations up-to-date*
Not only do I have this personal interest in the sub-
ject matter, but I feel my dutj'- as a good citizen necess-
itates a deep investigation of an issue before the American
people at the present time*
Because of the size and importance of the holding com-
pany, it is necessary to limit the subject matter in this
study so as to be able to present it thoroughly in the time
and space alloted* It is in the public utility field that
the holding company has m«de its most rapid and complete
development and it is in this field that it has been sub-
jected to most criticism.
A study of the holding company in the electric light
field was made by Douglas Hamilton Bellemore in 1932* Since
that date, there have been many developments both in the
electric utility holding company field and in utility hold-
ing company legislation* The above study has shown the
effect of the introduction of the holding company on the
electricity field* This thesis will study the holding com-
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pany and the effect a monopolistic or semi-monopolistic
field will have on it.
What is the holding company problem? It is my inten-
tion to show what it is by first defining the holding com-
pany and comparing it v/ith other types of business com-
binations. By studying its history too, we can get an in-
sight as to its function.
A determination of the problem also necessitates a
differentiation betv/een the terms, "public utility" and
"the public utility holding company."
Finally, one of the most important and newest fac-
tors to be discussed is that of the relationship of the
government
.
My information has been obtained from a wide reading
of textbooks, state and federal publications, periodicals
and newspapers, court decisions and opinions, and other
publications and reports—a list of which will be found
in the bibliography at the end of this thesis.
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Companies engaged in industry and commerce have often
found it desirable to combine with other companies. There
are various forms of business organizations that can be used.
One of these is the holding company.
Definition
What is a holding company? There are many definitions.
One of these, legally correct and widely quoted, by Bouvier
is, ”A corporation organized to hold the stock of another or
other corporations.” (1) Under this definition, any corpora-
tion that has the power to hold stock certificates represent-
ing shares of ownership in another corporation, becomes, upon
exercise of this power, a holding company.
There are three difficulties with this definition. In
the first place, there is the possibility of misinterpreta-
tion. It has been charged that certain corporations char-
tered by authority of Congress are holding companies because
the government grants them the power, among others, of hold-
ing stock in other corporations. A strict interpretation
of this definition, while not perhaps the one most common,
would uphold the person or persons making this claim.
The second objection lies with the word "corporation."
This definition would limit the holding company to the






it has been found that unincorporated
companies can be and also are holding companies. We, there-
fore, can refer to a definition by Professor Haney: ”A
holding company is a business organization which is created
for the purpose of combining other corporations by owning a
controlling amount of stock." (1)
In the third place, the granting of liberal pov/ers to
corporations in the matter of ownership of stock in other
corporations, and the development of corporations which own
stock in other companies for purposes other than control
and management, has made it necessary to limit the defini-
tion of the true holding company to those corporations
controlling and managing other corporations. We can refer
to a definition by Professors Bonbright and Means: "A
holding company is any company, incorporated or unincor-
porated, which is in a position to control, or materially
influence, the management of one or more other companies
by virtue, in part at least, of its ownership of securities
in the other company or companies." (2)
Jones and Bigham define it as: "The companies that hold
all or a majority of the stock of various operating companies,
and by virtue of the control thus exercised, manage the affairs
of the subsidiary companies ." (S)
(1) L. H. HANEY, BUSIITSSS ORGANIZATION Al'^D COliiBINATION
,
p.248
(2) BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, THE HOLDING COIv!PANY, p.lO
(3) JONES AND BIGHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, p.589

3These definitions point out that the term "holding com-
pany" has now been widely adopted to designate that form of
business organization by v^hich a number of business units are
brought together under a single centralized authority because
of ownership of stock in the units and by which the policies
of the entire system are dictated.
It necessarily involves the creation or prior existence
of a company which has the power to hold the stocks of other
companies. In corporations, this power, like any other cor-
porate power, must be definitely granted by the state of in-
corporation.
The controlled corporations are nominally and legally
independent and operate under their own names. They can be
effectively managed by officers of the holding companies of
whom the directors vote the stocks held by the holding com-
pany, or a controlling part thereof, and so elect the direc-
tors of the controlled companies.
The securities of the corporations to be controlled
are obtained either by a direct exchange for those of the
holding company or by purchase for cash which has, been pre-
viously obtained by the sale of securities of the holding
company,
II Types
Pure holding companies may be distinguished from op-
erating or mixed holding companies, (1) A pure holding
(1) HANEY, op, cit,, p,267
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4company is a corporation organized for the purpose of acquir-
ing primarily the voting stocks and other voting securities
of other corporations and does not engage directly in the
management of the constituent plants. Generally, but not
necessarily, it holds not less than a majority of the voting
securities of any company.
The pure holding company is not an operating company.
Its management is concerned chiefly with establishing
policies, leaving the details of the execution of those
policies, and the actual operations to the experts in
each company.
Operating holding companies or the mixed holding com-
panies are companies which are engaged in one or more lines
of business activity and also ovra securities of other cor-
porations, Very commonly, such companies are the head
or nucleus of a subgroup of companies. Cases of this kind
range from those in which the holding of other companies’
securities is incidental, measured by the relative investment
in such securities and in operating facilities, to those in
which operations are subordinate in importance to the owner-
ship of securities. Usually, operating holding companies are
not implied by the customary use of the term, ’’holding com-
pany.” (1)
Holding companies can be classified also according to the
relative time of formation, (2) If a holding company is formed
(1) DEVfflY, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS, p.857
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5first and later organizes its subsidiaries, it is known as
a "parent” company. The American Telephone and Telephone
Company, with its many state and regional subsidiaries
throughout the United States, is an excellent example of
this type.
Where, as in the majority of cases, holding companies
have been formed to consolidate the control of existing cor-
porations, they are classified as "consolidated,” or off-
spring holding companies. The Consolidated Gas Company of
New York is an example of this type.
Again, holding companies may be classified according to
their relative position of control. "Primary holding com-
pany," "top holding company," and "system holding company”
are terms used to designate that holding company which con-
stitutes the single head of a system of subsidiary com-
panies, (1) Sometimes the term "primary control company”
etc. is used in the same significance,
"Intermediary holding company," "intermediate holding
company,” "subholding company,” "subsidiary holding company,"
and "subordinate holding company" are terms used to designate
those holding companies which in turn are controlled by other
holding companies. They are agencies through which another
corporation accomplishes its purpose.
(1) FIELD, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO STUDIES, p.2E9
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6A useful and legitimate variety of the holding com-
pany is the parent company and suh companies. In the case
of an invention to be exploited, the parent company may
hold title to the patents, licensing the subordinate com-
panies in each state to handle the invention locally. (1)
There are three types of holding companies; manage-
ment, financial, and investment. The holding company which
combines independent companies under a centralized roanage-
meht or control is an example of the first type. These
"control” companies direct the policies of the other com-
panies through ownership of a majority or more of the
voting stock of the latter.
The financial holding company is a holding company
whose primary function is to make profits by financing the
operations of other companies through promotions, under-
writing, and reorganization. Incidentally, it may exer-
cise more or less control over the companies which it
finances, but this is not its main purpose and the con-
trol is temporary during its financing period. The in-
come from dividends or interest on investments is not a
chief consideration.
The investment holding company has as its chief pur-
pose the holding of securities in other companies for the
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7sake of income and long-pull appreciation. Such an organ-
ization would ordinarily avoid control and would seek di-
versity of holdings. In typical cases, the investing com-
pany is formed to handle the funds of an individual, a fam-
ily or a small group.
"Investment trust" is a loose expression which is used
to designate several types of securities owning organization
and may be investment holding companies. (1)
III Ob.jectives
The objective of the holding company (from the point of
view of its promoters) are both managerial and financial. (2)
A. Ivlanagerlal
The managerial objectives consist of so arranging the
capital structures of the subsidiaries and the holding com-
pany so as to give control with the least possible invest-
ment and to take advantage of large scale operations through
the mechanism of pooled services of management and engineer-
ing facilities.
The most distinctive characteristic of the holding com-
pany is the pyramid corporate structure. A relatively small
investment in the common stock in the higher levels of a
pyramided structure may represent absolute control of under-
lying operating companies with assets of millions of dollars.
(1) FIELD, loc. cit.
(2) THE LINCODS: LIBRAJRY OF ESSENTIAL INFOmA.TION, p.l265
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8It is obtained by holding a majority of the voting
stock of a corporation. This corporation in turn holds the
majority voting stock in another corporation. This process
is repeated a number of times and by the introduction of
two or three intermediate companies, and the issuing of
bonds and nonvoting preferred stock or stock with unequal
voting rights, complete control of a large operating com-
pany can be secured and maintained by an ownership in-
terest equal to a fraction on one per cent of the proper-
ty controlled, according to Berle and Means. (1)
Professor William Z, Ripley describes its effect
thus
;
”A ten per cent ownership, most of which does not
cost the owners a penny, carries control of the remaining
nine-tenths of the participation.” ( 2)
B. Financial
The holding company is a device for centralizing finances.
The financial objectives of the holding company are united
financing, the advancing of money to subsidiaries, and capital
inflation.
(1) BERLE AND 15EANS, MODERN CORPORATION AInID PRIVATE
PROPERTY, pp.72 and 73
(2) RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET, p,119
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9These objectives may be attained by causing the hold-
ing company not merely to purchase a controlling interest
in the outstanding stock of its subsidiaries, but also to
sell to the public its own securities.
The primary reason for this financial use of the hold-
ing company is to be found in the superiority of the larger
organization. Small enterprises find it difficult to raise
capital, partly because small security issues are unknown
and are not desired by investment banks, partly because a
limited and local enterprise does not enjoy the diversity
of risk which characterizes a larger system.
United financing can be utilized in three directions:
the indorsement of securities of the subsidiaries, the mar-
keting of the securities of both the holding and the sub-
sidiaries, and the advancing of money by the holding com-
pany.
Capital inflation can be obtained by recapitalizing the
financial structure of one or more enterprises through a sub
stitution of the securities of the holding company for the
securities of the subsidiary companies. This may result in
the placing of a higher value on the subsidiary and is known
to the man on the street as, "watering the stock."
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A. Prior to 1888
Prior to 1888, a few companies had the privilege of
owning stock by special legislative enactment, while no
state empowered a company to hold stocks of another un-
der its general incorporation laws. Some states, includ-
ing Pennsylvania, definitely forbade intercorporate hold-
ings.
The holding company was introduced in the railroad
field. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, founded
in 1832, appears to be the earliest holding company in the
United States, Other early holding companies are the Penn-
sylvania Railroad Company, 1853; Chicago & Northwestern
Railway Company, 1864; and the Western Union Telegraph
Company, 1851,
Perhaps the first real holding company of large size
was the Pennsylvania Company, It was organized in 1870
under special enactment of the state legislature in the
interest of the Pennsylvania Railroad to permit the latter
to centralize control of certain lines.
Much of the early history of the holding company was
written in the oil industry. The South Improvement Com-
pany created by a special act of the Legislative of Penn-
sylvania in 1871 and said to have been a factor in the
practice of railroad rebating by the Rockerfeller interests,
was one of the earliest companies formed. Its charter was
revoked in 1872,
:u v
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In 1888, 1889, and 1893, the State of New Jersey added
to its general stock incorporation law provisions making it
possible for a corporation formed under it to include in
their charter the specific power to hold stock in other
corporations; something theretofore allowed only by special
grant, as we have noted. According to J, L. Jackson, it is
not easy to allay the suspicion that those who fostered the
creation of this right anticipated the passage of the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act in 1890, which made illegal "every con-
tract or combination, .. in restraint of trade or commerce." (1)
In 1890 and 1892, the so-called trust form of organization
was declared unlawful in the so-called Sugar Trust and
Standard Oil Company cases. This led to the belief that
"big business" would utilize the holding company idea.
It is well to note that at this period other states
were moving to legalize the holding company device at the
very time that the Federal Government was endeavoring to
stamp out the evil usages of the pooling and trust devices.
Between 1893 and 1897, few corporations took advantage
of the holding company plan because of the unsatisfactory
state of business during that period.
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Between 1898 and 1904, a number of industrial secu-
rities holding companies were organized. This v/as a period
after the trusts were ruled out and during an epoch of
complete or nearly complete consolidation in industrial
and railway businesses.
Holding companies were attacked under the provisions
of the Sherman Law prohibiting combinations in restraint
of trade and monopolies. In one case, the Northern Secu-
rities Company, a holding company formed for the purpose
of holding stock in the Great Northern and Northern Pacific
Railway Companies, was enjoined in 1904, from voting any
of the stock held and the constituent companies were en-
joined from paying dividends to the Northern Securities
Company. (Northern Securities Co. vs. U. S. 193 U. S. 197)
It became evident that holding companies, if in re-
straint of trade, would be declared illegal. This tended
to somewhat check the holding company movement. In 1911,
the Supreme Court in the "Standard Oil" and "Tobacco"
cases decided that the language of the Sherman Act meant
and had alv/ays meant that only contracts "unreasonably”
restraining trade were illegal and ordered the Standard
Oil Company and the American Tobacco Company dissolved.
Previously, in a series of cases heard during the years
1894 to 1896, the Supreme Court refused to construe the
'Ic iloocra na bue t;.o 5‘»r.':. t-e'/- 3ri;J isS-Ib
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Sherman Act as prohibiting merely those contracts "unreason-
ably” restraining trade and steadfastly and repeatedly re-
fused to apply this so-called "rule of reason.” (1)
It was in a large measure the liberal language of these
court decisions following the Northern Securities Case which
prompted Congress to enact Section 7 of the Clayton Act of
1914 which was calculated to strengthen the law against the
holding company device by prohibiting holding companies in
restraint of trade and making them illegal when creating
monopoly.
The resulting loss of charter business resulting from
the insistence of the then Governor V/oodrow Wilson in 1913
that the power of stock ownership be eliminated, served
only to stimulate the legislation of the broadest of powers
in 1917. Other states in order not to lose incorporation
and annual franchise fees, began a "race of laxity,” as it
is characterized by Justice Brandeis in E88 U. S. 217, to
grant liberal incorporation privileges.
Since the Clayton Act of 1914, the holding company has
been used chiefly for investment and financing purposes,
controlling large aggregation of companies which are not
directly competitors.
Between 1925 and 1930, holding company organizations
have played important parts in the electric and gas utility,
railway, industrial investment, and banking fields.
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V Comparisons with other types of corporate combinations .
V/e have defined the holding company and have briefly
sketched its history. In order to understand it still
better, it will be profitable to compare it with two other
types of business combination--one
,
the trust, which it
resembles; the other, the consolidation and merger from
which it differs,
A. The Trusts
A simple business trust is a form of business organ-
ization under which the legal title to property is vested
in an individual trustee or trustees. The property is
managed by them in the interest of former title holders
who become beneficiaries. The trustees become not agents--
as are partners—but as principals. They can make con-
tracts, and can sue and be sued in their own names.
Under the comiaon law, trustees may and do issue shares
of beneficial interest, the capital of the trust being
divided into these shares. These certificates are much
like the stock certificates of a business corporation,
1, The Intercorporate or Combination Trust
rOne of the variations of the simple business trust
idea is found in the intercorporate or combination trust
which was effected by organizing a board of trustees to
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whom were transferred the stock certificates of the com-
panies to be controlled. The stockholders of the corpo-
ration entering the trust received trust certificates in
return. The trustees, holding the certificates of stock
in the several corporations, elected the directors of
these corporations and thus controlled their activities
in accordance with a common policy as effectively as if
the corporation were a single company. (1)
The advantage of this form of trust was that it v/as
not an incorporated body under statute law, Hov/ever, its
life was short for the courts declared it an illegal ex-
tension of the common law trust principle, (2)
The combination trust, being an agreement between a
group of individual trustees and a group of corporations
affect the latter in that by implication they give up
their autonomy and so act ’’ultra vires”
;
beyond their
power in so far that it involves dealings between cor-
porations resulting in partnerships between them, A hold-
ing company is duly authorized to deal in stocks of other
companies; therefore, its acts in this respect are legal,
whereas, the trust, in the eyes of the law, is not.
(1) FINNEY, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUITTING
,
Vol. 2, Chap, 47 p.
2
(2) BYE & HEV/ITT, APPLIED ECONOMICS, p.89
-.. 0 -'livT s9J t itJioc --coJs ^,is iiO'i'io'lzna'it STe-r jionw
' aifij *> ' Li&^icii?{i>o?« siT . ^ali.oTi’noo ot eetiisq
?jc^ Dtii:Ms>c 32vxk»oy>r <5ii^ snirttfjix© noid^fm
c • liro ^>ffT ^ .'ixMos^ ^aeataint er?T *£rlifd‘9'i
to ^'^od4Jw•‘ii^ €>.^d t3d-'5i)£e'
,
fe^ioid-aioq-xoo iBiayae a£
2oi:d*jrv'.tto^ ei^'^d aas eao£s.*^i5Toqioo
tx as ''flsvidoette a/4 vi>t£c<r rfoginoo a sijJyr fl>ons6ioooB ai
1 1 ) ."rxsq^sosr »X3iTJ:s 5 e»xdw npld'stcoq'ioo erfcf
Gsvr dx v'X-ifu ?j0w lo iriQt BtiiJ' to eifi*
e£„ ,x6T-*jsv.‘" .w.I -xetau \i>OQ' Sod-Bioquooct as ^ofl
-X© as •'f'i £»i^’:'i':XoeX a.t’xxroo Slid* lot Xiorie ajTvt ett£
(S' . Biqiofiiiq Y'iX noffiffioo ed^ to aoiensX
s asjv;dsd r..G ^riXsrf noiteaiorco erfT
un<}.tXs%vq'ioo to cjiOi'=i 6 :jnii asadoa'id XsafeiYXSxti to czjot^
aj; &vl:} T^Ckr .lOiXsoXX^^i Y '' al loJtjsl sif? dostte
iXaziX ;>aoviKf sttlu” Xo» oe bna vitoao^as Tlod?
-..:3 ,'TOo^sd a:oniiB3j& asviorai tX d'czld xst otj aX xovoq
./off eqiil8i©ad-'isc ai TidUIuasn: eaoXXsaoq
xodvo t'> ?>?ocdc ni Iso5 od &osX-iarfXaa ^XxfX> ei: viiaqisioo 3ni
. v^vl ©‘IS tooqe^ii sXiU nx edoa axi ,9iott»'iddd ; sexasq^ioo
.ioa «i ^wsl siiS to b&Xi^ tXsxia* o::t
,
s
. J .lTSf?0 tOT ,xJ/lIT5rX')D0A
-r T /





2. The Voting Trust
The voting trust is ”a kind of special express trust,
which may be defined as a form of organization in which
holdings of stock are combined by placing them in the
hands of trustees to be voted in a stipulated manner.” (1)
A voting trust agreement is entered into, and stock cer-
tificates transferred to a board of trustees. In return,
the trustees issue trust certificates or negotiable trust
receipts.
All stockholder’s rights except voting remain the
same. The trustees collect the dividends and are bound to
pay them over to the holders of the trust receipts.
Unified voting is the object of voting trusts, and
the ownership of property is not vested in the trustees;
they are trustees of management and not of property.
Its chief purposes are to carry out a judicial de-
cree, to insure control, and in cases of reorganization.
This type of trust is legal and is undoubtedly le-
gitimate when used reasonably. The only limits to the
legality are that they must be for legal objects and not
discriminatory against other stockholders; they must be
formed for a reasonable duration of time, preferably not
(1) HANEY, op. cit., p.134
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.
for a longer period than the life of a proxy; and that
they should he open to all stockholders desiring to enter.
3, Massachusetts Trusts
The Massachusetts Trust or voluntary association is,
"an association of persons with a combined capital repre-
sented by transferable shares for the purpose of carrying
on a common project for gain.”(l) The organization is
created by filing with the properly constituted state
authority a declaration of trust or indenture. By this
form of organization, property is transferred to a board
of trustees. Transferable certificates of ownership can
be bought and sold after the manner of ordinary stock
certificates.
These securities holding trusts have been formed in
some states which do not authorize corporations to hold
stock of other corporations, especially where the law
prohibits the consolidation of public service corporations.
This is true of Massachusetts electric railway companies
and gas companies. The procedure is simply to put a
majority of these stocks of several companies into the
hands of trustees who then issue certificates in any
amount desired.
(1) LINCOLN, APPLIED BUSINESS FINANCE, p.76
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They are virtually holding corporations, but are not
subject to the law regulating corporations. Their legality
may be questioned, according to Haney. (1)
From the viewpoint of economics, there is very little
difference between the holding company and the trust. The
chief difference exists in their standing at court. To
change a trust to a holding company, a process illustrated
by the history of the Standard Oil Company, it is only
necessary (1) to substitute the stock of the holding com-
pany for the certificates of the trust, (2) to substitute
the board of directors of a corporation for a board of
trustees, and (3) to substitute a permanent transfer of
stock or ovraership for the trust relation.
4. Investment Trust
An Investment Trust or Investment Company is formed
purely for investment purposes and its essential function
consists of the purchase and sale of stocks and bonds, and,
in some cases, property. The company derives its income
almost entirely from interest and dividends on the securi-
ties it holds; from syndicate profits, where it participates
in syndicate underwriting; and from profits on the purchase
and sale of securities. It does not attempt to manage the
companies whose securities it owns. It buys securities
(1) HAiMkY, op. cit., p.134
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as an investor would do and without any purpose of deter-
mining the policy of the management .( 1
)
It differs from any holding company including the in-
vestment holding company, in that (1) it does not properly
become interested in any one company that it cannot imme-
diately withdraw its investment; and (2) its management
recognizes some degree of fiduciary responsibility to a re
latively large number of investors in its securities. In-
vestment trusts properly seek safety of principle and a
reasonable and continuous income through diversification;
and they avoid control, management or financing respon-
sibilities.
However, it appears that holding companies, although
they differ from the investment trust, can, with slight
changes, transform themselves into the legal semblance of
investment trusts,
B. Consolidation and Merger
The last stage of combinations and the one to which
all others lead, in the opinion of Professor Taussig, is
the great or giant corporation, (2) The holding company
tends to develop into it, its subsidiaries being deprived
of their nominal independence, and the shareholders being
direct shareholders in the single company.
(1) WALTER M. Y/. SPLAM, HK4RINGS BEFORE THE C0im!ITTE OK
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COmffiRCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
72nd CONGRESS, First Session, on H. R, 9059, p.5
(2) TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, p.443
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There are two types, the merger and the consolidation.
”By merger is meant the transfer of the assets of one or
more corporations to another corporation under special
statuatory power, whereby the latter corporation, a single
legal entity containing v^ithin itself the corporate life of
all its constituents, remains as a single and sole owner of
the combined assets.... It is distinguished from other forms,
first, by the fact that one of the constituent corporations
retains its existence; and, second, by the fact that all the
other corporations automatically disappear.” (1)
"Amalgamation or statuatory consolidation refers to a
combination of the assets of two or more corporations under
special statuatory power, whereby all the amalgamating cor-
porations are dissolved and one newly created corporation
takes over the sum total of the assets. It is distinguished
from a merger by the fact that all the old corporations dis-
appear and a new corporate entity takes its place.” (2)
The difference between the form of organization above
described and the holding company is fairly obvious. The
holding company retains separate existence of the combined
organization and controls them by voting the stock. It can
not formally act for the constituent companies independent
of their directors. It is at most a partial or temporary
consolidation.
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We may list "below the chief though by no means the
only reasons which dictate a resort to mere stock control,
rather than an outright fusion:
1. Ease of organizing the Combination.
2. Ease of Reataining Control through Stock
Pyramiding,
3, Legal Advantage of the Holding Company.
4, Secrecy of the fact of the combination
and of its financial accounts and
operation.
5. Freedom from governmental regulation.
6, Decentralization of management.
7. Insulation of liabilities to creditors.
8, Ease of divorcing the properties, (1)
However, it can also be said that most of the very
characteristics that favor the holding company in certain
aspects at the same time militate against this form of or-
ganization in other aspects.
I. Ease of Organizing
No form of combination of anything like the stability
and permanence of the holding company is organized v;ith such
facility. (2) Its first advantage, therefore, is facility
of promotion.
The promoters of the holding company can more readily
procure the necessary stockholders* votes and the necessary
financing than any other form of consolidation.
(1) ADAPTED FROM BONBRIGHT AND IviEAITS, op. cit., p.30
(2) HANEY, op. cit, p,269
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Because of the generally greater ease of acquiring an
interest in a company’s stock than in purchasing its assets,
and the possibility of acquiring control by securing a ma-
jority of the stock, it is a common practice to expand by
purchase of securities rather than by securing direct legal
title of the assets. (1) The same consideration may also
apply and account for the continuance of the corporation
rather than subsequently winding up its affairs and closing
it out.
If an attempt were made to buy the subsidiary companies
outright it might be rendered futile by the unwillingness of
a few individuals to surrender the separate existence of the
organizations in which they are interested. The formation
of a holding company requires no consent on the part of the
stockholders of the subsidiary companies, for the promoters
may buy up stock in the open market until they get the con-
trolling interest,
"Aside from the problem of securing the necessary vot-
ing power, the financier faces a far easier and less ex-
pensive task in financing a combination through a holding
company than in financing a fusion. In the former case, all
that is necessary is to exchange the securities of the hold-
ing company for the controlling stocks of the subsidiary
(!) REPORT ON PIPE LINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
72nd Congress, p.XLV
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companies. In the latter case, on the other hand, there
must be an exchange of all the stock of the subsidiary com-
panies for the stocks of the merged or amalgamated company.
Sometimes, arrangements must be made to fund or refund the
bonded debt The counsel fees and underwriting fees of
effecting a complete fusion may alone run into the millions.” (1)
However, the very ease of organizing and financing the
combination suggests that the financial structure, when
once set up, is likely to be less sound than that of the
single, merged company.
2. Llaintenance of Control
By all means the most important advantage of the hold-
ing company lies in the ease in which it may be used to con-
centrate and maintain control. (2) In the first place, only
a majority of the voting stock of each subsidiary company
need be secured in order to make control by the holding
company effective, and even the purchase of less than the
majority of these stocks may be sufficient for "working con-
trol.” With the merger and amalgamation, on the other hand,
the assenting vote of the stipulated majority of the share-
holders (often including non-voting stockholders and some-
times extending to bondholders) of each company, generally
a two-thirds majority, is required by state law. Moreover,
(1) BONBRIGHT AND I;IEANS, op. cit. p.30 and 31
(2) Ibid, p.45
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a dissenting minority may hold up a merger, either by
challenging the fairness of the plan in the courts, or by
insisting on their right to an appraised valuation of their
shares and to a cash payment. No such embarrassment stands
>
in the way of purchase of a controlling interest in a sub-
sidiary company. (1)
A financial shortcoming of the holding company arises
from the concentration of control. ?/hile a top heavy-
superstructure arising from the piling up of a series of
its own securities on top of the securities of its subsid-
iary may please a management that is interested in maintain-
ing control by ownership of the thinnest possible equity,
it must displease any management that is interested in the
financial integrity of the system rather than in the oppor-
tunity of stock jobbing profits. (2)
3. Legal Advantage
Business men sometimes prefer the holding company be-
cause legal obstacles would make fusion impossible or at
least difficult to effect. (3) These obstacles may be due
to the restrictive provisions of a charter or to state laws
restricting the business of foreign corporations, or to state
or federal laws preventing particular types of enterprises,
such as railroads, from engaging in other forms of enter-
prise, or restrictions imposed by earlier mortgage, so drawn
(1) BONBRIGHT AND I.2EANS, op. cit.
,
pg.30
(2) Ibid, p.46 and 47
(3) BONNEVILLE, op. cit., p.274
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together under the general control and supervision of
the holding company; but the more detailed problems
of organization as well as many of the larger questions
of policy, may be assigned to the directors and officers
of each separate subsidiary company.” (1)
There are many advantages in decentralization.
It may effect unified management while preserving the in-
dividuality and initiative of constituent organizations.
Business enterprise, after reaching a certain size, may
become inefficient and may lack the personal touch of the
executives of the smaller company. Also, operating con-
siderations may dictate the continuance of a separate cor-
porate personality especially where the new company is en-
gaged in a local business, or a business different from
that of the parent company. Then, too, better results are
anticipated from the placing of responsibility on officers
and directors of subsidiary companies than by disrupting
the organization* In some cases, companies are newly or-
ganized to take over certain branches of work in an effort
to decentralize operations and at the same time centralize
responsibilities.
( 1 ) BOl'JBRIGHT MJD IvIEAInIS
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While the holding company undoubtedly facilitates
the policy of decentralization, its importance and sig-
nificance may be easily exaggerated, (1) Decentralization
is by no means desired in all cases,
7, Insulation of liabilities to Credition
"Although a holding company may so completely dominate
its subsidiaries that all the properties really form one
great operating and financial system, each subsidiary none
the less retains its separate corporate existence, and this
legal separation is not often disregarded by the courts. In
some respects, ,, ,a separation of this kind is a source of
annoyance to the interests that control the entire system.
In other respects, however, it is a source of advantage, and
one of these advantages lies in the insulation of each cor-
poration from the creditor liabilities imposed upon all of
the other constituent companies," (Ej
8, Divorcement of Properties
The final basis of comparison of the holding company
and outright fusion, is the relative ease of undoing the
combination if later events should show it desirable. Al-
most any consolidation of companies under a single control
and management is necessarily in the nature of an experiment
at the outset, Bonbright and Means claim that a fusion of
(1) BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, loc, cit,
(2) Ibid, p.47 and p,48
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all the constituent companies into a single corporation
makes it extremely difficult to break up the system into
its component parts, A combination by means of a hold-
ing company, however, makes a subsequent separation of the
subsidiaries relatively easy, especially in the earlier
stages of the holding company’s existence. They feel
that the fact that a system made up of holding companies
can be so conveniently broken up if the controlling in-
terests so desire, suggests that it may be in danger of
being broken up despite the v/ishes of the people in
control. (1)
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I. The PuUlic Utility
Before proceeding to a discussion of specific
phases of public utility holding company activity, it
will be desirable to discuss the characteristics v/hich
distinguish public utilities from other industries as a
basis of comparison between the public utility and the
public utility holding company.
A public utility, in the legal sense of the term,
means "an organization v/hich supplies the public with cer-
tain types of essential service held to be subject to a
peculiar kind of public regulation. The supply of water,
gas, electricity, and transportation has been included by
the courts among the services that are in the nature of a
public utility." (l)
It has been defined by Bye and Hewett as "a group of
industries v/hose monopoly position is so secure, and which
controls necessities so important to the people that their
prices have long been subject to regulation by the public
authorities." (2)
(1) EONBRIGHT AlU) MEANS, op, cit. p.201




In early English law, there were certain call-
ings, such as inn-keep inc-, opp-ratinc^ a ferry and trans-
porting merchandise, which the courts declared were
"affected with a public interest" and which might, there-
fore, be controlled by a public authority* (l)
Neither the courts nor the comme’^tators have
set forth the doctrine of public interest with sufficient
definiteness to enable us to state what attributes will
cause an industry to be classed as a public utility(2) but
certain broad features which are usually characteristic of
such enterprises may be described:
They are affected with a "public interest", they are
monopolies, they have special legal privileges, they are pub-
lic servants and they are subject to regulation* (3)
"Private property does become clothed with a public
interest when used in a manner to make it of public con-
sequence, and affect the community at large*" (4) While it
is true that all business is charged in some way or other
with a public interest (5) these companies supply commod-
ities or service which are closely associated with public
( 1 ) ROOSEVELT , LOOKING FORWARD , p • 140
(2) NEW STATE ICE CO* vs LIEBMANN 285 U* S. 262- (1932)
(3) BYE & HEWETT, op* cit* p*428
(4) MUNN vs ILLINOIS 94 U. S. 113 (1876)
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The second characteristic of the public utility is
that it operates under conditions v/hich tend towards monop-
oly, (1) This is sometimes referred to as their semi-monop-
olistic character.
It is quite desirable that they should be regarded as
natural monopolies in order to prevent a duplication of the
large plant and fixed investment so necessary in industries
of this type. In those businesses where interest and dep-
reciation charges contribute a large element in the cost
of production, experience has taught that the financial
burdens incident to unnecessary duplication of facilities
may result in high rates and poor service.
Public convenience and economic necessity may demand
that public service company enjoy monopolistic privileges
not only because of the excessive cost of duplicating plant
and equipment, but also because these industries operate
under the economic law of increasing returns. We are will-
ing to accept monopoly and combination because we expect
to obtain better service at a lower cost.
Because the interests of the entire community are
directly concerned in the manner which it is operated,
the public service company is almost invariably the re-
(1) BADGER, IInTTESTIvMT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, p.347
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cipient of special privileges, in the form of the right
of eminent domain, the right to use the highways in spe-
cial ways, or the grant of subsidies in money and other
assets
.
They are recognized as public servants. People are
peculiarly dependent upon the railroads for their means
of existence and are compelled to patronize them. Similar-
ly the street railways, electric, gas, and telephone serv-
ices are so integral a part of domestic and business life
that the public is coming to be particularly dependent on
them. The same can be said of other businesses which fall
under the heading of public utilities.
The services they perform are a legitimate function
of the state. They must provide adequate services and
facilities to all who apply, at reasonable rates, without
discrimination. (1)
They are subject to regulation. The public right to
regulate them is based on the common law, strengthened by
statutes and court decisions. ( 2) The legal basis of con-
trol comes from the government character of the services
rendered, the grant of special privileges, or because of
the monopoly characteristics of the industry. They are
(1) FEDERA.L TRADE COIvMISSION, op. cit.
(2) vs. ILLINOIS, loc. cit.
ITEBBIA vs. N. Y. 291, U. S. 502 (1934)
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subject to regulation through the common law, by the fran-
chise or certificate of necessity, by legislative enactment,
and by commissions. The method of public control understood
by the term regulation concedes monopoly as absolutely essen-
tial in the interests of the consumer, (1)
Other distinguishing characteristics of public utilities
is the need for peak load producing capacity in the case of
railroads and electric power utilities., and for storage capac-
ity in the case of gas and water companies.
C, Types of Service
There are certain types of service which are recognized
in the public utility concept. They are common carriers;
service incidental to transportation; communication; power,
heat, light, and refrigeration; and water facilities.
The transportation industry is the largest public
utility industry in the United States, (2) The railroads
of this country were organized under charters as common
carriers, which allov/s them to render services only and
prohibits sale of anything, even their own coal,(3)
The electric and gas utility is the second largest
public utility industry in the United States, (4) It dif-
fers from the railroad companies in that the latter were
organized under charters as common carriers while the
(1) PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Ivlay 11, 1936, p,653
(2) JOHN J, BICiXEY, as reported in the "Christian Science
Monitor," March 24, 1936
(3) HEARINGS ON H, R, 5423, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SEVENTY-FOURTH CONGRESS, p,503
(4) JOHN J, BICFXEY, loc. cit.
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electric and gas utilities were not.(l) It also differs by
being essentially a local or state industry, whereas the
latter is primarily interstate.
The telephone Industry is the third largest public
utility industry in the United States, (2) In comparison
with the other utilities, it resembles the railroad indus-
try because of its interstate character.
In current investment parlance, the term public util-
ity is limited to light and power, both gas and electricity,
companies or organizations supplying either or both of these
services in addition to traction. (3) The term does not in-
clude companies engaged in street railroad, water, tele-
phone and telegraph business, unless these services are
merely incidental to the electric or gas business. There-
fore, in order to limit the amount of material in this
study, I will endeavor to confine the problem to the gas
and electric utility. Other reasons for this limitation
will be found in comparing the railroad and telephone hold-
ing companies with the gas and electric holding companies.
(1) H, R, 5423, op, cit.
,
p,502
(2) JOHN J. BICKLEY, loc. cit.
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II. The Public Utility Holding.; Comnany
It is in the utility field, that the holding company
has had its highest degree of development and it is in
this field that it has had its severest criticism*
A. Definition
The public utility hololng company, is thus
defihed by Professor Dewey:
-
"In its simplest form, the public utility
holding company consists of a corporation
organized under the laws of some state vrfiich
permits its corporation to hold the securities
of other corporations in its treasury* The
holding company acquires a control in the eq-
uities of local utilities, and through the
o¥/nership of these equities exerts direct fin-
ancial and management control over the op-
eration of the local utilities." (l)
According to the Federal Trade Commission,
"a public utility holding company does not
engage usually in supplying electric or gas
service to the public, but owns principally
the voting stocks giving control of com-
panies v/hich do ovra the generating and ms.n-
ufacturing plants and distribution facili-
ties for rendering such services. Through
this ownership of voting stock the holding
company names the directors and officers of
the operating companies through v/hom it dic-
tates the policies of these companies*" (2)
The effect practically is a consolidation of the sep-
arate companies* (3)
B * History
"The early history of the public utility hold-
ing company, although it does not extend back further than
(1) FINAHCIii tOllGY OF CORPORATIONS ,'"p *856
(2) FEDERiJ. TRADE CCiailoSIOH, REPORT OH HIELIG UTILIO^IES,
3EHATE DOGUKSIIT 92,Ho. 72 A, ^*179
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the eighties is very difficult to trace. The f irst cor-
poration of its kind analgous to the modern holding com-
pany was the predecessor of the present organization
known as the United Gas Improvement 'Company.*' (l) The
old United Gas Improvement Company was incorporated in
1882 as a Pennsylvania corporation, for the purpose of
introducing improvements in the gas industry. (2) As it
found great difficulty in introducing improvements, it at
first leased gas works in various parts of the United States
and subsequently acquired their stocks, beginning a round
1884.(3) At first the stocks of these gas companies c-
quired were placed in the hands of a trustee, as the general
laws of Pennsylvania did not permit one corporation to hold
the securities of another corporation. As this procedure was
indirect and ciunbersome, the company acquired the charter of
the Union Contract Company, and old charter granted by a
special act of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1870 (4)
which permitted, among other things, the corporation to pur-
chase and own securities of other corporations. (5) The name
of the Union Company was changed in 1888 to the United Gas
Improvement Company. The new United Gas Improvement Com-
pany then acquired the assets of the old United Gas Improve-
ment Company, by exchange of stock and also the shares of
(1) DE’*VEY, op. cit., p.858
(2) NASH, op. cit., p.406
(3) DEVi/EY, op. cit., p.859
(4) CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, JUNE 28 ,1935, p. 10771
(5) DE7/ING, op. cit., pg. 860-861
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gas companies held in the interest of the latter by-
trustees. (l
)
The success of this company as a holding company for
the stock of local utilities attracted others. The second,
in 1890, -was the North American Company, a reorganization
of the old Oregon and Transcontinental Company.(2) The
plan of the directors of this company was to develop, in-
tensively, the electric business in a single locality and
secure profits for the holding company through unified con-
trol and economical operation of all the electric utilities
of a single, relatively confined, but -thickly populated area.
(3)
In 1900, the American Light and Traction Company was or-
ganized for the purpose of acquiring and operating local
utilities. (4)
Later, certain great electric supply houses in develop-
ing a market for their goods undertook to encourage and even
to Finance local companies in many different parts of the
coxmtry.(5) That practice resulted in the acceptance of
securities as part or in whole payment of obligations and
later led to formation of holding companies to acquire the
local properties. ( 6 ) For a time these holding companies
(1) DEWING, op. cit., p.861
(2) NASH, loc. cit.
(3) DEV/ING, op. cit., p.862
(4) IBID
(5) SEVENTY THIRD CONGJRESS, HOUSE REPORT #8273, Part 2.Page VI
(6) RUGGLES, PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS AND
management, p.l92
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v:ere really subsidiaries or affiliates of the gres.t elec-
tric supply house. Some of these holding companies dev-
eloped very efficient service organizations v;hich were in-
corporated as subsidiary companies.
At first these electrical manufacturers created a
collateral trust, pledging a miscellaneous lot of public
utility securities as collateral for an issue of bonds of
the manufacturing company. (l) Sometimes the trust was in-
corporated and the stocks of the public utilities v;’ere giv-
en to investors as a bonus.
These trusts were the beginning of a system of market-
ing the securities of local public utilities thru the sale
of securities of widely known holding companies. This plan
also made available to the public diversified securities
issued by many companies operating in different communities
and in different geographical areas.
In time, promoters and speculators came into the field
and set up holding companies to share in the profits which
the older companies demonstrated as possible. During the
highly speculative period preceeding 1929, holding com-
panies Competed with each other for control of operating pro-
perties. (2)
(1) RUGGLES, op. cit., pg.l93
(2) HOUSE REPORT, #827, loc. cit
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Until after the World War, the holding company had not
made a favorable impression as a whole, but that might be
attributed to the development period. (1) After the war,
with the immense growth of utilities, the holding company
P
achieved prosperity by leaps and bounds. ;
In the study made by the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, it was found of fifty-seven holding
companies, twelve were chartered between 1906 and 1912,
four between 1912 and 1922, and forty-one between 1923
and 1929.(2)
1. Comparison wi th Industrials
The holding company in the public utility field dif-
fers from the holding company in the industrial field in
three directions.
Competition is still the source of reliance for the
control of price, quantity, and quality of output in the
industrial field; whereas, monopoly is the sound form of
organization from the economic viewpoint in the utility
field. The holding company in the industrial field, there-
fore, has been treated as a part of the trust problem, while
the public utility holding company has been treated as a
phase of utility regulation.
In the second place, the individual members of a keen-
ly competitive industry cannot add to their earning power
by corporate devices. In the regulated industries, such as
(1) FEDEPAL TRADE COMvIISSION, op. cit., p.857
(2) HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE ON PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COl^ANIES , p.69
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the public utilities, however, a gain is possible. In
the industrial holding companies, there has grown up no
such system of pyramiding and subdividing of investment
as found in the utility groups. (l)
In the third place, industrials and utility holding
companies differ in that sjibsidiaries of the utility hold-
ing companies are usually operating properties of similar
chara,cteristics v;ith few opportunities for the vertical in-
tegration found in industrial groups. (2)
2 . Dominance in Utility Pield
According to the i'ederal Trade Commission, holding
companies have dominated the privately owned electric
utility industry f or a niimber of years. (3)
The earliest study of control in the electric utility
industry was made by the United States Bureau of Corpora-
tions, a predecessor of the Federal Trade Commission 1916,
and concerned itself with developed water power.
In 1914, the public utility holding company in the
electrical utility field was not an important factor. Local
large corporations and management companies dominated the
industry .( 4)
( 1 ) H.R. 827 , op. cit., p«362
(2) I'lASH, op. cit., p.422
(3) FEDERAL TRnDE COMlilSSION, REPORT op. cit.,p.34
(4) IBID, p.36
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The first survey of the activities of the public
utility holding companies vras made in 1915 by the United
States Department of Agriculture. At that time it was
found that about tv;o thirds of the output of electric
power companies was produced by 85 large companies or
groups of companies. (l)
In 1924 holding companies controlled fabout 65 per-
cent of the operating electric utility industry. (2) The
companies in the General Electric Company group had approx-
imately 13 per cent of the industry, 6 other large hold-
ing company groups 28 per cent and other holding company
groups approximately 24 per cent. (3)
The growth of the utility holding company movement
attracted unceasing public attention and occasional fears
of undue concentration and domination in the electric pow-
er ana industry as early as 1925.(4) On February 8,1925,
a comprehensive investigation to determine the extent to
which the General Electric Company and other interests were
exercising control over the production and distribution of
electric energy and electrical equipment was authorized by
the United States Senate. (5)
(1) NASH, op. cit., p.407
(2) REPORT OF THE NATIONAL POY/ER POLICY GOMLIITTEE ON
PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES
(3) FEDERAL TRADE COLailSSION, loc. cit.
(4) NASH, loc. cit.
(5) RUGGLES, op. cit., p. 195
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According to the Senate report, in 1924, neither the
General Electric Company nor any other single power in-
terest, or group of allied pov/er interests, substantially
monopolized or controlled the generation, transmission,
and sale of electricity in the United States although there
is monopolization within certain states and lesser territor-
ial areas tending to transcend state boundaries* (l
)
During the years from 1923 to 1929, holding companies
already large and imgainly were still expanding in hope




H* S. Raushenbush estimated that in 1930 one half of
the electric pov/er generated by the large power companies
was in the houses of three great holding company groups;
that two thirds of the electrical energy was controlled in
six groups, and over 90^ by 15 groups. (3)
In 1932, 13 large holding company groups controlled
three fourths of the entirely private owned electric utility
industry concentrated in the hands of the three largest
groups at that time. United Corporation, Electric Bond &
Share and Insull (4) which between themselves controlled
40^ of that industry. (5) Even these three were not total-
ly independent ,( 6 ) United Corporation having a stock in-
(1) SENATE DOEUMENT #“ 213-pg.50 and 51
(2) DJET/fEY, op* cit* pg.893
(3) LAIDLER, GONCEUTRATIOE OF CONTROL IN INDUSTRY,pg 152 &153
(4) senator V/HEELER CONGRESSIONAL RECORD , (MARCH 28 ,1935 )p . 4774
(5) SENATOR EICHIR, HEARINGS ON H.R. , 1318,op*cit*p. 49




interest* in tlie Slectric Bond & SJmre Coinpa.’^y*
In the years between 1930 to 1934, many holding com-
panies failed* Others were broken into homogeneous units
by fear of impending failure. The influence of the de-
pression has brought the evidence of weakness of mere size
without cordinated control. (l) On May 11,1936, the Fed-
eral Power Commission reported that 50^ of the electric
utility industry were controlled by nine large holding company
systems and that 90^ of the industry was controlled by 57 prin-
cipal systems. (2)
Accordine- to the New York Times, in 1936 12 systems of
holding companies got 53^ of the total revenue from the sale
of energy to consxjmers. ( 3)
The rise to power of the holding company in the gas
utility industry has no less been startling than in the field
of electricity. In 1932, eleven holding company systems con-
trolled 80*29 per cent of the total mileage of natural-gas
trunk pipe lines, on which the gas fields almost completely de-
pend for the marketing of their product* In the field of
gas production, distinction should be made between manufactur-
ed and natural gas operations* In the latter field
there are three types of companies; covering the function of
(1) DEWING, op. cit. p.893
(2) NEWS ITEM IN CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, MAY 11,1936
(3) NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 27,1936 P.IOE. ARTICLE BY
HAROLD B. HINTON.
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production, transmission and distribution respectively.
In this field the holding company may control all three
types of corporations, operate them as one system, fixing
the prices #(l)
D. Types
Accor dins to Bonbright and Means, there are four types
of holding company combination;
1. The combination of competing or adiacent properties.
2. The combination of widely separated utilities, per-
forming the same or different services, and having no phy-
sical inter-connection.
3. The combination of two or more utilities operating
in the same territory, but performing different services.
4. The combination of utility enterprises with non-
utility enterprises. (2)
Each has its advantages and disadva^^tages . The com-
bina^tion of competins or adjacent properties in an industry
subject to regulation is of economic good in that there is
elimination of wasteful competition and there is the technical
economies of large-scale production and distribution. It is
the earliest form of combination.
The combination of adjacent utility properties earries with
it many advantages beyond the gain resulting in elimination of
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competition and large scale production. There has been
developed greater technical efficiency in the use of steam
and hydro-generating plants, long distance transmission lines
and the improved load factor which may be secured by a tie-
up of residential, commercial and industrials users
^
The most characteristic form of the public utility
holding company is a centralized control of widely scattered
utility enterprises. (l) The advantage that may result from
this type are l) improvement of management, 2) better terms
for purchase of supplies, and 3) improved financial status
and stability of securities.
According to the Oommittee on the Tublic Utility Bill
of the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Com-
merce :
”The holdine: company ownership of scattered
properties performs for the financial el-
ement of the cost of po7/er what the physical
connection of operations performs for the
physical elements of the cost of power. '.Vhen
both are present, the result if cumulative."
(2)
Ko7^ever, as the size of the operating company grows,
the advantage of this form of centralized management opera-
ting at a distance decreases.
(1) B0U3RIGHT AilD MEANS, op. cit
. ,
pg.l93
(2) APRIL 30,1935, in the COilGRESSIOiNfiO. RECORD , jms 6,1935.
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The combination of more than one type of utility serv-
ice in the same territory has to meet the problem of com-
petition betv/een these services. There is less advantage
of unified service than in the other two combinations stud-
ied. The effect on the control of rates where one type of
utility is more profitable than the other has attracted the
attention of public service commissions.
The fourth type of utility combination would include
a combination of electric utility with cotton cloth mills,
paper mills, banks, and hotels. (1) The disadvantage in
this type is that the utilities may be forced to support
non-utility losses.
According to the Federal Trade Commission, there are
two more or less well-defined types of holding company
groups in theory but no sharp separation between the types
in actual practice. (2)
There is the diversified investment type and the large
connected type. The former does not consist of one con-
tinuous chain or net-work in contiguous territory, but are
utilities that are separated geographically.
The latter type of holding company groups is one where
the utilities form on contiguous net-work,
A description of the types is given in the Summary
Report of the Federal Trade Commission. (3)
(1) DEVifEY, op. cit., p.702, footnote ”b”
(2) FEDERAL TRADE COMUSSION, op. cit. p.84
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Of 487 holding companies listed on the stock ex-
change in 1928, 46 represented railroads, 36 represented
“utilities" and 407 represented “ industrials"
.
(l) While
on the face of these figures, the railroads and “utilities"
Beem less important, the fact that they are subject to re-
gulation of varying degrees, allows us to examine them more
closely than the “industrials".
E. Railroad s
In the electric and gas utility field, the pure hold-
ing company has become the dominant form of combination. In
the railway field, with a certain few important exceptions,
it still plays an subordinate role. (2) This distinction is
vital, j for a parent railway or utility company, being an
operating company is subject to direct supervision of state
and federal comiidssions while a utility holding company, un-
der existing laws, is comparatively free from regulation.
There are three reasons which largely account for the
striking difference between, corporate organizations of gas
and electric utilities and the railroads: first, the more re-
cent developments of the former business, second, the re-
latively small size of each "utility" operatine" unit and third,
the freedom of financial control enjoyed by the railroad op-
erating companies prior to the transportation Act of 1920.
(1) SENATOR DIGKIiJSON, CONdRESdlONrlj R3G0RD, JITEE 6 ,1935 ,p. 9083.
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In the railway holding company field we find the
Alleghany Corporation, the Pennroad Corporation and the
Chesapeake Corporation. (l ) These are holding companies in
the guise of investment companies. (2) Possible speculative
gains on security holdings v/ere hoped for, but a strong mo-
tive was to strengthen control and build up great systems
without the sanction of regulation by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. ( 3) With the coming of the Transportation Act,
holding companies have been formed in a desire to escape re-
gulation of that act, (4) but the Holding Company Act and the
Transportation ^ct of 1933 were passed in an endeavor to check
this new ]growth.(5)
2 • Communication
Of the three largest groups of public utilities, no group
of an entire industry is so completely dominated by a single
holding company or ownership group as in the case of the tele~
phone service. L,ost of the important telephone companies
in the United States have been brought together in a nation
wide system under the direction of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (6) a holding company of two dozen operating
concerns within the Bell interests . (7
)
Cl) RTIuULri.TI(jH OF STOCK OsVHEKSHIP IN HaILROADS , Hr.J:'UKT 2759
71st. Cong. 3rd. oeesion, pg.878
(2) HAHEY, op. cit., pg.258
(3) IBID, pg.255
(4) KEGULATIOH OE STOCK OvifUEHSHIP IK RAILHOaD§ , loc. cit.
(5) HEaRIKGS BEEOHE COMMITTEE OK IKTERSTATE AKD EOREIGK UOLikERCE,
Seventy -Fourth Congress, op. cit., p.l36
(6) K03KER aKD CRAWFORD, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULaTIOK, pg. 32 6
, (7) LAIDLER, op. cit. p.91
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The telephone, telegraph and radio companies differ
from the gas and electric utility holding companies in
that the former, like the railroads, are subject to both
State and 5’ederal regulation (l) whereas the latter is sub-
ject only to State regulation, if any, up to 1935.
In contrast to the electric poY/er industry, the tele-
phone business in tne United States shov;s greater concen-
tration of control.
(
2 ) In 1931, the Bell system owned and
operated more than 75^ of the telephones of the United
States with the balance connected v/ith the Bell System im-
der contract whereby complete int erconmiunication is possible.
Only 103,000 of a total of 21,200,000 telephones in the United
States in 1931 v/ere independent and non-connecting. (3)
In 1936, the federal Communicati ons Commission found th«t
the ^erican Telephone and Telegraph Company was the top block
in a structure of 200 corporations, controlling 93-| per cent
of the telephone investment in the United States, 85/^* of all
the telephone instruments and 97^^ of the long distance voice.
(4)
Three principle facts were brought out in an inves tigat ion
by the federal Communications Commission: (5 ) 1. The Bell
Tl) MOSHER aUD CRA^i7?OiiD, op . cit
. ,
pg.369
(2) UiiSH, OP. CIT. pg.410
(3) IBID, pg. 411
(4) CHRISTIAN SCISRCi; MONITOR, Karch 24,1936
(5) IBID, April 6,1936
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system holds admitted a “virtual monopoly” of telephone
communications in the United States.
2. Its ramifications due to inventive and research v/ork ex-
tend into many fields outside telephone service.
3. Its legal department keeps close watch on legislation.
It is generally agreed that the holdine: company in the
telephone field ia of economic and social value in the in-
dustrial life of this nation. Uo doubt it is a fine ex-
ample of the holding company in the utility field.
3 . Electric ijz Gas
In the electric light and power industry, holdins: com-
pany control has been quite extended, but that control thus
far is divided by a number of financial groups and, as yet,
there is no movement towards a single nation wide holding
company, comparable in its field to the American Telephone
and Telegraph Company.
The development of the holding company in this industry
is predominantly a development of the last decade - mostly
from 1923 - 1930. (l)
Amonc groups of holdins companies in this field, there
is extreme diversity as to (l) financial magnitude, (2) busi-
ness fields, (3) organization and (4) geographical extension.
( 2 )
(1) E. R. 827, op. cit., p.8
(2) IBID, PART 2, op. cit., pg.6
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Wtille the corporate form of organization is universal in
this field, we find an individual enterpreneur
,
partner-
ships, trusteeships, lessees, as well as a superlatively
complex examples of organizations involving various and
devious combinations of corporations, llassachusetts Trusts
and management contracts.
The problem is complicated by the fact that many com-
panies are mixtures, having within their structures quasi-
utilities, industrial plants and even hotels. (l)
F, Reasons for Formation
"The basis for the holding company in the gas and elec-
tric utility field lies, on the one hand, in certain economic
needs of small operating companies for financial, engineering,
and managerial services and, on the other hand, in the per-
sonal ambitions of the individuals who form the holding com-
panies." (2) The two are not necessarily antagonistic.
Professor Dewey attributes four reasons for the Justi-
fication of the public utility holding company. They are the
technical, management, public relation, and financial advan-
tages of this form of organization. (3)
1, Economic
The holding company is necessary in the utility field
from the economic viewpoint because of the technical efficien-
cy of a centralized management of a number of companies.
(1) DEVffiY, op, cit.
,
p.878 and p.879
(2) FEDERAL TRADE COmiSSION, op, cit., p.ll8
(3) DE\VEY, op. cit., p.863
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By reason of its ownership of a number of utilities,
the holding company is able to employ men of far greater
technical knowledge and ability than the comparative meagre
resources of the single local utilities. Most utilities
were operated during their early existence by local men who
knew very little of the technique of the business, accord-
ing to Professor Dewey. (1) Although these men soon learned
the business, they v/ere unfamiliar v/ith the technique of
the industry.
The holding company performs an economic function in
that it is a mechanism for pooled services of management
and engineering as well as other services such as engineer-
ing research and certain other scientific services which
no company can afford to carry on for itself.
A central organization can deal more intelligently and
farsightedly v/ith the public authorities and the customers
than can the local organization, especially in the placing
of contracts and the establishing of rates. The holding
companies also render its subsidiaries assistance in the
matter of new business, business policy, rate schedules
and capital outlay schedules. (2) Perhaps the most con-
spicuous help of the holding company is the unprecedented
flow of capital into the public utility industry, (3) making
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possible extensions and improvements of service.
The outstanding problem of all public utilities, with
the exception of tiassachusetts
,
since the beginning of the
centuiy, has been the financial problem of obtaining cap-
ital. The technical advances of gas and electric mechanics
have outstripped capital available to take advantage of these
advances. In the presence of competition for capital both
within and without the industry, that utility has fared best
which had some financial support. That support has been given
by the holding company. (1)
The main financial function claimed for the holding com-
pany is to assist in financing the needs of the subsidiary
that serve relatively small cities and rural communities.
The principal assistance is rendered through furnishing funds
through purchase of common stock, and selling the preferred
stock and bonds of the operating company to the investing
public. However, in many cases, the fixed capital of many
operating companies was written up to such an extent, and
bonds and stocks sold to the public in such amounts, that
the comrflon stocks of operating companies were held by the
holding company at little or no cost to it, according to the
Federal Trade Commission. (2)
(1) DEWEY, op, cit.
,
p.870
(2) FEDERA.L TRADE COMIvIISSION, op. cit., p.l20
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The second financial function is that of temporary fin-
ancing the current capital needs of the subsidiary pending
permanent financing. This is done through the process of
paying supply bills for the operating company and of leaving
in their treasuries the funds representing earned surplus
available for dividends on their common stocks which are own-




The third financial function has been to furnish more or
less temporary funds needed in senior security financing of
operating companies when market conditions are unfavorable.
2 • Personal
Electric and gas holding companies are also mechanisms
whereby their organizers and their successors promote their
own financial interests and careers. a number of leading
electric and gas holding companies iiave each been dominated
by a single individual or a small group of individuals. It
furnishes the opportimity of working out a career, or assures
him business by taking control of his clients, or reimburses
him for an outlay made in the acquisition of securities, or
offers him the opportunity to develop great power through the
building of a great financial group, and offers him many
opportunities for personal profit. Sometimes the occasion
for the holding company forma.tion is the accumulation of a
(1) EEDERaL TRaDS COMMISSION, op. cit., pg.l20 and 121
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mass of securities, or in the process of furnishing a re-
sale market for the securities of clients, or in the pro-
cess of man ipulatins* the market for such securities. The
prices paid for additional units in a system have been fre-
quently run up out of reason by rivalry of contending sys-
tems in order to satisfy personal desires.
G# Advantageous development
David E. Lilienthal, now a member of the Tennessee
Valley Authority, in an authoratative article in the Col-
umbia Law Review in 1929 wrotes '*The holding and manage-
ment con^jany has come upon the field, demonstrated its prow-
ess and in a relatively few years changed the entire economic
nature of the public utility industry.
“
1. Operating corn-pan ies
Holding company control and management of public utility
operating companies has resulted in developments to the ad-
vantage of the operating company and is reflected in connect-
ed operations, large scale operations, and expert management,
technically and commercially. These advantages appear in
varying degrees as affected by volume of business, localities
served, and possibilities for the development of the operat-
ing companies. (l)
(1) FEDERAL TRADE C OMLIISSION, op. cit. , p.834
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The utility industry, especially in the electric and
gas fields, has had a phase of free lance pioneering in
which rapid development was facilitated by the holding com-
pany, the readiest means of bringing together many unconnect-
ed operations lying in a single and indifferent states into
one connected unit of operation, (1) Such a grouping of ad-
jacent communities connected by means of transmission lines,
especially in the electric field, makes it possible to link
the various independent power units into superpower systems.
By combining steam and hydro-generating plants, the super-
power systems can get the greatest benefit possible to the
entire system. This interconnection is possible between
operating companies of different ownerships, but owing to
the inability of assessing the benefits, it is more satisfac-
tory and more practical to have common ownership or one
hundred per cent ownership of subsidiaries, (2)
On the other hand
,
there are examples of intergroup of
electric pov/er such as the Connecticut Valley Pov/er Exchange,
Safe Harbor, and others v/hich do not depend primarily on the
sajme management.
This interconnection of power companies and plants has
resulted in the construction of more efficient central sta-
tions of large capacity with a lower cost of production as
(1) NASH, op, cit., p,427
(2) REPORT OF BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL, DEPARTIv^lNT
OF COIvIMERCE, loc, cit.
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the demand for power increased
,
and as the marginal or sub-
marginal power plants were abandoned. With connected op-
erations, there is the broadest opportunity to use only
the larger and more efficient plants and those with a lower
cost of production. This development and interconnection
has resulted in greater use of the facilities which have
been constructed because of the demand. There has been an
increase from two million kilowatts installation with an
output of two billion kilowatt-hours in 1910 to a thirty-
five million kilowatt of plant capacity with a production
of nine billion kilowatts in 1930.(1)
Maintenance and prompt restoration of service in flood
districts, hurricanes, and other calamities also demonstrate
holding company advantage of connected operation and connect
ed operation facilities. (2)
The improvements in the electric utility industry which
include larger and more efficient generating units and im-
proved transformers, has made it possible for the holding
company to reduce investment per unit of capacity and costs
per unit of energy produced in large-scale production. (3)
The economy due to the purchase of equipment arise
from greater intelligence and from the economy resulting
from large contracts with manufacturers. Economies are
often possible in the purchase of standard equipment where
(1) HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMIITTEE OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE ON H. R. 5423, op, cit.
,
p,271
(2) NATIONS’ BUSINESS, January, 1936, p.36
(3) FEDERAL TRADE COI.MISSION, op. cit. p.34
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no discriminatory judgment is required. Pooling of orders
often permits maximum "quantity” discounts. Centralization
of the placing of insurance and the handling of claims by
a specialist makes for lov/er premiums and more favorable
settlements.
The smaller properties cannot afford to employ regular-
ly and exclusively a high degree of administrative, financial,
and technical skill. A large holding company can command
and retain a capable trained staff available at all times
and at comparatively small cost to its individual subsidia-
ries, (1)
The advantage of having marked technical skill to direct
the general policy of a small company while the actual opera-
tions have to be left with an immature or partly trained lo-
cal superintendent, has unquestionably worked out well in
practice says Professor Dewey. (2) The administrative opera-
tion of any public utility consists of two fields of activity.
The operator must determine the technical policies of the
company, and he must attend to the day-to-day routine busi-
ness, The former requires a broad knowledge of utility en-
gineering, the product of a highly specialized technical
training and wide experience; while the latter can be entrust-
ed to a man of mediocre ability, (3)
(1) NASH, op, cit.
,
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It has reduced the cost of borrowing money by better
financing whereby money for improvements and expansions
sometimes has been obtained at lower annual costs and
easier terms, due to the broader field of operation and
the larger volume of financing resulting from combining
the capital requirements of a large member of corporations.
( 1 )
The credit of the holding company is the credit of a
going concern to which each new project is an extension.
In comparison, the project is alone and in the eyes of the
investor more speculative and thus would demand a higher
return on the investment. (2)
2. Consumer
Advantageous developments, in the interest of con-
sumers, which have resulted during the growth of the hold-
ing company in the public utility field may be classified
as improvements due to widely extended service, improved
service, lowered cost of service and increased use of
appliances. (3)
There has been widely extended service, especially
in natural gas and electric power fields, reaching many
small communities, suburban areas, farms and isolated in-
dustrial operations.
(1) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT OP, op. cit. pg.838
(2) BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL OF THE DEPARTMENT OP
COMMERCE, op. cit.
(3) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit. p.841
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•'We find a much improved service in dependability,
regulation of voltage, adequacy to meet grov/ing demands
with little or no delay, all results of new investments
and greater skill in construction and operation"
,
says
the 5’ederal Trade Commission* (l)
During the last twenty-five years, with the exception
of the war and immediate war period, there has been a de-
crease in the price to the consumer and an extremely low
price to the large hydro-power user. (2) The latter re-
duction has been possible through a reduction in the cost
of capital. (3)
With regard to lowered cost of service to the con-
sumer, the Federal Trade Commission reports;
-
•*There may be a difference of opinion
as to whether rates were reduced as fast
or as far as they should have been, if
based on fair calculation of all costs;
but the records show what is known to
everyone that the general levels of prices
for utility service have tended to decline,
owiner primarily to lower operating costs." (4)
Y/ith regard to increased use of applistnces, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission sayss-
"While intensive methods designed prim-
arily to sell appliances and thereby in-
crease bills were used, they had the effect
of bringing directly to the consumer know-
ledge of various devices and methods cap-
able of increasing convenience, comfort and
health and reducing cost of operations in
the home or factory.** (5)
HTHfEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, loc. cit.
(2) IBID
(3) BUSIiCESS ADVISORY COUNCIL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
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The holdine company in the utility field has benefited
the investor in three directions. It has made for the
diversity in character of operating companies, it has re-
duced the cost of borrowing money and given its stockholders
the advantage claimed for large scale business.
However, the Federal Trade Commission in its report
to the U. S. Senate on Public Utility Corporations does
not seem to be very much impressed by the ben#^fits accruing
to investors in this non-competitive field v/ith its ex-
pectation of a reasonable return on investment. (l)
H. Detrimental Developments
The holding company in the public utility field has
been subject to many abuses which have resulted in develop-
ments detrimental to the interests of the operating com-
panies, the consumer, the investor and the social policy.
The Federal Trade Commission summarizing investigation
which began not under the **Hew Deal” but in 1928, and which
consists of some 84 monthly reports, (2) charged utility
holdinc companies or rather some of them, with having fost-
ered many vices. (3)
There is disagreement as to how extensive and how ser-
ious these abuses have been, and it is fairly clear that
they were representative of a minority, rather a majority
of the industry. Yet it is plain that they have been
u) federal" TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit. pg.857-858
(2) IBID, Senate Report on Utility Corporations Do^ximent
No. 92 84 B




3 .'Ki‘ -.0 :>b „i e-.i
- ..nox:ti;o-i tv oa-.j- xii 'loJrj.ovrii; ortj
c;ira Ji S/ntifi^rs^o :uoJ c...'i/;i!a Jtii-Z'vib
i.' ^:I?i^Nrcstu Qjj: iif^vr- v;:)'^oni ;::ii\vc;^:rocf lo re>z.i:b









.:ri uOyjiK vn^v cJ oo;i




.,.j.. I Y> X ,C .i.,)i; 0 ).*tix; i; orij nj; '.'rxiiqaiOv ,;rti;oIoi; ariT
-. n- r)vJXvt.:,-r av.:.:
.iri.:.r naexicf*; vr:.:;;- cJ ioatdw's noscf
--.loa a.l:1 Xo
nr..-.rxX^i>
















^ T ' •
- 2 i; r: X V \;iLsa bj'io
- iic; wod ;.iio =.rta(o*X'j
•.v.,:i o. i!„ J;i3 oo-i'.uL . uX s-xadV
j' u :^-„i2 c^/xi^x B£ ti i.. .




;.tiior:i y ^ Mb r,v ;Oi a-XBn y;cdj
no.>J 3vy.: i.dJ d.;,'Xq ai Mi May
. riM..-..,i acj Ma




« .^Vv; ', ;
'."i'‘^'
V




-i.-iliiTT aa rxiXZ '£)
' 1
65 *
sufficient prevalent to put the whole industry in public
disrepute and to warrant serious regulatory efforts to
prevent the continuance or recurrence of these activities*
While these practices have been lawful they have produced
such undesirable resTilts so as to require that they be out
lawed for the future*
According to the Federal Trade Commission, the abuses
of the holding company fall into two classes:
1) Unsoimd and/or needless financial structures and
practices which are a detriment and frequently a menace to
the investor or the consumer or both*
2) The milking of the operating companies thru the
device of nximerous forms of contracts and arrangements* (l)
!• Operating companies and consumer *
Since the management of the holding company and the
subsidiary are identical, the accoimting system used can
make the separate interests of the subsidiaries subservient
to the interest of the holding company, (2) and defeat the
effective regulation of the operating company* (3) The
operating companies are affected by, (a) upstream loans,
(b) contracts, (c) write-ups, (d) inadequate depreciation
provisions, (e) intercompany sales, and (f) manipulations
affecting profits, (g) interlocking directors and trustees*
(1) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON UTILITY CORPORATIOK
NO. 73 A* pg*64
(2) DEWEY, op* cit* p*880
(3) MOSHER & CRAWFORD, op* cit* p*351
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Professor Dewey points out that the moat serious
injury the holding company can do to the subsidiary is
that of using the stronger credit of the subsidiary to
bolster the weaUcer credit of the local company# (l) This
is known as the upstream loan# The Federal Trade Com-
mission claims that looking at the situation generally,
neither upstream nor downstream loans form a large part of
the outstanding indebtedness of holding or operating com-
panies, the great mass of their obligations being held by
the public# (2)
b# Service# sales and construction contracts .
It is through the service, sales and construction con-
tracts that the holding company has “milked" the operating
company by charges for services and commodities# Where
these charges were not exorbitant or not excessive, they
were questionable because these contracts were results of
transactions not made at arm’s length, but are decisions of
the holding company itself sitting through representatives
on both sides of the table# It is firmly established at
law as seen, in the decision of Smith vs Illinois Bell Tel-
ephone Company (282 U# 3. 133) that there is no constitution-
al right to derive profit from a contract of this kind#
(1) FIHANCIiO> POLICY OF CORPORATIONS, p#881
(2) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION .REPORT ON UTILITY CORPORATION,
N0.72 A#, pg# 856
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The Federal Trade Coimnission in its report to the
Senate on Utility Corporations makes the following com-
laent on profit makins arrangements:
**Th«t the holding company making the charges ab-
solutely controls the activities of the operating com-
panies and of the servicing organization and are, in that
respect, contracting with themselves; that not being public
utilities, the holding companies are not subject to control
in the form of either actual or potential competition from
other servicing organizations or direct control by any pub-
lic regulatory body in determining the fees charged; that
fees for other service, to the extent that they include a
profit, increase the expense of operation, and likewise
tend to increase the rates payable by the consumer, and fin-
ally, that the profit element in fees furnishes obviously a
temptation to increase the amount of special services rend-
ered for which a fee is charged may be prejudicial to other
security holders as well as to the taxpayer*'* (l)
"These contrafts involve a minimum of cash investment*
by the controlling interest being mostly salaries* Anything
received as fees over the cost of such management is profit
to the holding company." (2)
(1) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit*, p*844
(2) IBID, p.843
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It is through these contracts that the holding com-
panies have confined their business relations and business
patronage to inside groups and have increased their power
and influence over other businesses which receive their
patronage. (1) The exclusion of independent contractors
and independent engineering and construction companies has
resulted in an absence of "arm’s length" bargaining and a
restraint of free and independent competition,
c. Write-ups .
In order to establish a base for excessive rates, the
fixed capital account of the public utilities have some-
times been "loaded" with arbitrary or imaginary amounts, (2)
Another practice has been the writing up of the fixed as-
sets v/ithout regard to the cost thereof with the result of
watering the stock or creating a fictitious surplus. There
is disagreement among authorities as to the actual effect
on rates of these practices where regulatory commissions
are particularly strong.
d. Inadequate depreciation provision
.
In order to meet the problem of adequate net income
and pay interest and dividends on inflated capitalization,
the management of some holding companies found it necessary
(1) CONGRESSIoAN EICHER, op. cit., p.52
(2) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op, cit., p.846
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to resort to various devices for showing fictitious in-
come* (l) One of these was a failure to include ad-
equate depreciation provision on the fixed assets* The
immediate consequence was §n overstatement of net in-
come* A possible result was the payment of dividends
out of capital or original plant investment*
e* Intercomnany sales *
Another detrimental development has been the en-
gaging in transactions involving the purchase and sale
of property or securities with controlled or subsidiary
companies for the purpose of recording arbitrary valuation
unjustified by market values* The holding company position
in this field is adapted to the manipulation of rates and
charges for intercompany sales in a way to increase or de-
press the revenues and profits of one company in relation
to other companies in a holding company group* A Highly
prosperous company might be obliged to purchase its energy
at a higher, or sell at less, than a fair price to keep
down its apparent profit, while an unprofitable company
might receive excess benefit thereby*
Obviously an effect of public regulation designed to
limit profits of individueil companies is to tempt controll-
ing holding company management to keep the apparent profits
U) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op* cit* pg*849
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of the more successful companies just below the re-
gulation point, transferrins am.y excess profit to some
other less favored or less regulated unit in the system*
This has been true in the natural gas field where the con-
sumer may pay higher rates because neither the transpor-
tation nor the production is a regulated public service* (l)
2* Investor
According to one well known utility operator, the
public utility holding company gtnd a public utility company
have been synonymous, in the eyes of the investing public* (2)
The results of such abuses as have been perpetrated by cer-
tain speculative holding companies have been and will be far
worse for the investing public than for the consuming public,
since the latter is protected from abuses by the regulatory
control of operating companies. (3)
Investors have been affected by a) unsound or needless
financial structures and practices and b) by the milking of
operating companies* These arise from the possibilities of
manipulation by insiders*
a* Unsoimd or needless financial structures and practices *
iimong the unsoimd or needless financial structures and
practices which result in a disadvantage to the investor is
the pyramided structure found in all the important holding
(1) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op* cit* pg*853
(2) SAlilUEL FERGUSOM, PRES*HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT CO*
ELECTRICAL WORLD ( Jan *21, 1933)
(3) IBID
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companies. (1) By the pyramiding of holdings through nu-
merous intermediate holding companies and by issuing, at
each level of the structure, different classes of stock
with unequal voting rights, it has frequently been possible
for relatively small groups to gain control by means of a
disproportionately small investment and to manage solely in
their own interest tremendous capital investments. (2) This
feature represents the holding company at its worst, accord
ing to the Federal Trade Commission. (3)
Pyramyding is objectionable, not only because it makes
for concentration of control, but it also aggravates the
promotion of highly speculative stock—aptly called "high
leverage stock" with features which make such issues unsuit
able for investment purposes. This so-called "leverage"
creates the appearance of earnings disproportionate to the
actual earnings made by the underlying companies, and re-
sults in a high rate of return on common stock when operat-
ing companies are prosperous, but a low or no return when
business of the operating companies shrink, (4) thus de-
stroying the very stability of the securities v/hich it is
the function of the properly managed holding company to
create. (5)
(1) FEDERAX TRADE COimSSION, op. cit.
,
p.858
(2) BUSIITBSS ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR TEE DEPARTIvIENT OF
COl'IMERCE, loc. cit.
(3) FEDERAX TRADE COmiSSION, op. cit., p.860
(4) Ibid, p.858
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Another unsound or needless financial device is that
of capitaQ. inflation. Securities have been issued on the
basis of fictitious and inflated asset values and in antici-
pation of excessive revenue and paper profits at the expense
of underlyine operating properties#
It has facilitated stock watering and similar forms of
misfinancine and financial practices that tend to impose
losses on thousands of small investors as well as to injure
consumers by higher rates and poorer service# (l) None of
the holding company groups examined by the Federal Trade
Commission appears to have suitable capital structure from
an investor's standpoint in the opinion of the Commission.
( 2 )
Manipulation of the security market to deceive stock-
holders » bondholders or potentieO. purchasers of its sec-
urities have been found# Speculation has been stimulated
by putting funds into the call-loan market#
Huge transactions have been effected by mere entries on
books of fictitious stock subscriptions without any transfer
of money or credit# (3)
Holding companies in the utility field have been en-
gaged in the “two master racket” whereby the same interest
is both underwriter and trustee, both director and banker.
Unreg\ilated public utility holding companies have en-
couraged unwieldly and uneconomic forms of consolidation,
(1) BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op. cit# pg#153
(2) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op# cit#, p#859
(3) CONGRESSMAN RAYBURN, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD(Jime 27,1935)
pg#10721
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which violate the principles of maximum efficiency of
operation, (l) and which tend to concentrate authority of
operators instead of owners*
The public utility holding aompany has made for sec-
recy of corporate accounts and helped facilitate manipu-
lation of the various constituent companies* (2 ) Despite
protestation to the contrary no single holdinar company
group can be said to have made public sufficient information
to permit a clear understanding of all inter-company re-
lations and transactions that have occurred within the group,
or between members of the group and affiliated interests out-
side it* In a number of cases, such groups have done every-
thing in their power, including court action, to delay or pre-
vent disclosure or complete information in official inquiries*
(3)
b* Milking of onerating com-panies *
In order to support their own inflated capitalization and
earn profits for themselves and holding companies higher in
the series, the holding company have resorted to various de-
vices in order to get the largest possible amount of revenue
from the operating companies to the detriment of the invest-
or in the operating company*
The service charge and numerous contracts and arrange-
ments have been used to a great extent* In general, it can
(1) BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op* cit. pg*153
(2) IBID
(3) MOSHER and CRAWFORD, op* cit* pg*353
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be said that uncontrolled and often undisclosed charges
for "services” assessed by remote holding companies and
excessive fees paid to affiliates may, and sometimes do,
defeat the purpose of rate regulation, assuming that pur-
pose to be a minimum reasonable charge to the consumer, {!)
The holding company that makes ownership of the com-
mon stock equities of operating utilitj'- companies its prin-
cipal line of investment is naturally desirous of obtain-
ing the maximum of earnings from its investment. (2) Such
earnings may be from dividends, service charges or fees for
financial, construction engineering and management services.
Fees for operating supervision and management are
charges to operations expenses which give the holding com-
pany a claim to the revenues prior even to the bond interest
and dividends. These expenses are results of contracts be-
tween the right hand and the left hand of the same controll-
ing corporate interest. (3)
By means of a tax or a general fiscal agent service,
the holding company figured the tax for such subsidiary on
the basis of operations for that subsidiary, then consoli-
dated the return of the group, cancelling losses against
profits. It collected the full amount of tax as computed
from the subsidiary and realized a profit from this transac-
tion since consolidated tax reports were permissable.
(1) HANEY, op. cit., p.278
(2) FEDERAL TRADE COmilSSION, op. cit., p.842
(3) Ibid, p.843
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However, this source of profit was eliminated by the
passage of the 1934 Revenue Act, eliminating consolidated
tax returns.
3. Public control .
The regulation of public utilities is hindered by the
public utility holding company. (l) Managing holdina: com-
panies have too often assimed the prerogative of managing
properties at the same time in other relations have dis-





State laws have been circumvented by use of the vol-
untary trust, foreign ownership of stock, foreign incor-
poration and dummy holders of stock. (3)
The allocation of .charges for service management,
construction and other contracts among subsidiary public
utility companies in different states have presented prob-
lems of regulation* (4)
The control of subsidiary public utility companies
affect the accounting practice and rate, dividend and other
policies so as to complicate and obstruct the state re-
gulation of these subsidiary companies.




(3) IBID, pg. ,879
(4) PUBLIC #333, pg.2
VC joj: r’iij i ^'io'Iq 'io e tri? < it>v£yV/o;i
ri'io .:-iijl-. ,XoA ©ifiiGYsH *»>60X sriJ- lo o~^:^v.BBq
bfc'f i;’ si, Rt^irUIior
-
.00 r.iui'/.Oii f oM (i;-
,i-.n/:r; 'io c-v t/.SiiOTO'tq oiiJ
* rriju;; S'jL
• Xo- i j-goc' £
r>iio/;q lo noxj '<XiJ5.-s^ ori^
^a1js..jtioo ^fixi)Ioii Y-iliJ-x; f-ilbirq
bv)rrj;oec oocf 2sixii=.q
:.lb 9vrn ca&r*r.Cy- 'CviIJ-o ni ori 3 amxje 9d:^
“isa 31 JV/ bnr/r’r'- orU no i XicfxKnoqso'i bcmixJlo
(s' . 4.ji.>xXir'ioc'joo




t ’uc J ; qiiieioiiivo n^.is'iol '^'i.joXru/
•.
^ - •' '^0 B’xeblcii ViVX'fiUb Xjn<i XfOiixiOq
t o ii-jr-ttv;,
oX.Cciijq vY
:!^;n eoiv'xss *rcl scs'xr.rio. lo nci*£c.oII;: sriT
tb,!e.Oi/n • n.i.'j;-. SNtc^'X^rioo ibr'.J’O noiboL'i^exioo
- ovas*’ Lf-cJ'x.jc ciT; nX aoifujqmoo xX id'j:;
.
.noiw,jX/J5;o*i. aciaX
ooxxii^qxioo vXilxj;- ..tinvq X'iii-cbxociufe lo IO*lJllOO
r ;: l';i :i; X Y X
'
5*>j./x Xnn oox^J’o&^q ortxjfnijooof? sxlit Xos‘?:l9
-S'! vcri4i: Jox/xid--io I :... £^xoxlqiir:co o& na oa pdioiloq









In our present economic organization, we rely main-
ly upon private enterprise to carry on the operations of
industry. However, where private enterprise proves unable
to fulfill its function or fails to function adequately,
or where its activities endangers the general welfare, we
resort to government intervention. This intervention may
be prohibition or regulation of an industry.
Hot only is the government concerned in this question
of public and private ownership, but it has an interest in
the performance of the corporation as a legal privilege
aince it is a party to the granting of the charter of incor-
poration. Moreover, the government has an interest in the
holding company because the holding company is a phase of the
trust movement and because it is now a part of the utility pro-
blem* .
A. necessity
Haney (l) states that there are two problems of business
organization under which the holding compajiy can come. One is
the trust problem, the other the corporation problem. These
problems are separate but interrelated. These problems a-
rise out of a desire of the state to prevent unfair competi-
tion and carry out a rigid regulation of monopolies.
Cl) BUSIHBSS ORGANIZATION AND COMBINATION , op. c it. ,p. 422
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!• The Trust Problem
The trust problem has to do v/ith aggregation of cap-
ital tending towards monopoly and illegal ends* In exer-
cising social and political control over monopolies, two
alternative policies are open. We can maintain free com-
petition by the elimination of monopoly conditions or we
may permit monopolies but regulate their activities.
The first policy, that of maintaining competition
and eliminating monopoly, has been the dominant one in
dealing with the so-called trusts. This policy, as we
have noted, has been applied to the industrial holding
company but not the public utility holding company.
The second policy, that of regulation, has been fol-
lowed in the control of railroad and other utilities.
2. The Corporation Problem
The holding company is definitely a part of the cor-
poration problem, a larger problem which arises out of the
privilege granted by the state creating an artificial per-
son with limited liability and transferability of owner-
ship.
Circumstances, supported by complex legal devices,
like the holding company, have brought about the condition
whereby management has been dissociated from ownership and
responsibility. In theory and in the original simple cor-
porate structure, the management of the corporation is elect-
ed by and responsible to the stockholders. With our modern
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complex corporate structure, this theory seldom works out
in practice.
Ownership of property in the form of corporate wealth
is now widely held hut the control of large corporations
is concentrated in few hands. There are these two distinct
groups, a widely dispersed group of investors and those in
control of the corporation. Up to date, management has pro-
ceeded as if in ownership, (1)
The advantage of dissociating control from ownership
is that it makes control stable and permanent.
However, this system has brought to the fore many prob-
lems. Berle and Means, in their "Modern Corporation and
Private Property," say;
"The rise of the modern corporation has brought
a concentration of economic power which can com-
pete on equal terms with the modern state-econom-
ic power versus political pov/er, each strong in
its own field. The state seeks in some aspects
to regulate the corporation, while the corpora-
tion, steadily becoming more powerful, makes
every effort to avoid such regulation, V/here
its own interests are concerned, it even attempts
to dominate the state," (2)
Another phase of the problem is due to the 'liberality
of laws" of certain states which give rise to many corporate
evils. Such liberality includes "protection of excessive
discretion by directors in the acquisition and sale of prop-
perty; the recognition of contracts in which officers and
(1) JOSEPH P. ICEN1\^EDY, SATURDAY EVENING POST, January 16, 1937
p.lO
(2) BERLE AND I\IEANS, MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY,
p.422
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directors have private interests adverse to that o'f* the
corporation; the recognization of contracts with other
corporations having the same officers, permission to issue
stock of no nominal or par value; abrogatim of the preemp-
tive rights of stockholders to purchase new issues of sec-
urities; and legislative recoenition of voting trusts,” (l)
That there must be control over corporations is con-
ceded, There is now some control over corporations, and
the tendency is to msike that control greater, not less.
3, The Utility Problem
It is in the field of local public utilities that the
holding company has reached its highest stage of develop-
ment.
Professor Bonbright declares that the controversy
whether or not a better system than the holding companies
might have been devised for the control of electric utilities
is futile, “Fortunately or unfortunately”, he says, “the
holding company has become an integral part of the American
public utility enterprise, and the practical issue is of its
regulation rather than that of its destruction."
Many other writers believe that the holding company in
this field can Ije a sound and useful institution if properly
regulated. (2) Congress, on the other hand, has taken the
position of elimination of most public utility holding com-
panies,
rrr”FEDERAL trade COMMISSION, op. ait., No.73A, p.lO
(2) PRENBERGAST , op, cit. , p.98
JONES & BIGHAM, op. cit., p.610
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”Publio control utility corporations have tv/o broad
groups of objectives. The first, and most important, is
designed to secure for the public as consumers the maximiim
extent, q.uality, quality and benefits of service consistent
with a fair classification of nondiscriminatory rates that •
will afford a reasonable profit to the utility organization', (l)
“The second group of objectives relates to taxes, taking
property by eminent domain, property-holding rights, rights
to conduct business, registration, issuance of securities, and
other provisions of general state incorporation laws. “(2)
In respect to the necessity for regulation of the pub-
lic, utility holding company as a public utility corporation,
we find two points of view. According to one view, the
holding company is neither in legal doctrine (3) nor in ec-
onomic reality a public utility, (4) while the other view is
that the existance and the management of the holding c.ompany
are of decided publi'^ interest, and regulation of the operat-
ing company must necessarily be ineffective as long as the hold-
ing company remains free from c ontrol. (5)
As might be expected, the former view is vigorously urged
by the utility interests. They claim that the only excuse
for the regulation of utilities is to be found in the public




(3) NASH» op. cit., p.422
(4) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit.. No. 73 A. p.l79
(5) BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op. cit., p.l49
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interest in adequate service at reasonable rates* To be
sure, other people, notably the investing public have in-
terests which, on occasion, may require some degree of pub-
lic protection from mismanagement and financial exploitation.
Thi« protection is not properly within the jurisdiction of
the public service commissions or special statutes concern-
ing public utilities* They claim tha,t the investors in
utility holding companies need no more special protection
than investors in industrial a>^d bankin/^- holdina- compa^iies*
The consumer only, has special need for protection against
the unrestrained action of a public utility* The conclusion
follov/s that unless the operations of a holdin^^- company can
be shown to have a material affect on service or on rates of
the public utility, that they are of no concern to a public
service commission* Since a holding company by its very na-
ture is not an operating company, and consequently does not
charge any rates to the consuming public nor supply it with
service, it has no effect on rates and service and should there-
fore not be regulated as a public utility* (l)
With regard to the legal viewpoint, even though a cor-
poration controls the policies of a public utility and is known
publicly to do so, nevertheless it is not a public utility in
the legal sense and is therefore not subject to court action
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and regulation as siach* With few exceptions, the state
commissions have declared and the courts have held that
public utility holding companies are not public utilities
as defined by the regulatory laws of the states .(l)
While legeilly it is not a public utility, nevertheless,
it is claimed that since the public utility holdiner company
through the ownership of voting stock names the directors
and officers of the operating and subsidiary companies, it
dictates the policies of the latter ajid therefore is an owner
and operator of a public utility enterprise. (2) There are
court decisions holding that corporate fiction may be dis-
regarded where one company directs the affairs of another. (3)
In certain situations where the parent holding company and its
subsidiaries are to all intents and purposes run as one cor-
poration, the courts will disregard the separate corporate en-
tities. The test of the courts appears to be whether the
ownership of stock of the holdine company is resorted to for
making the subsidiary a mere agent or in strumentad. ity and of
so co-mingling the affairs as to make the two c.ompanies vir-
tually one. (4)
Unless this theory of the “disregard of corporate
entity" is availed of, there is serious question whether a
holding company, even if defined as a public utility by legis-
lative declaration, can be subjected to direct regulation under
(1) NASH, loc. cit.
(2) im)ERAL TRADE COmaSSION, loc. cit.
(3) PRENDERGAST, op. cit. , p.97
(4) CLAY, op. cit., p.249
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existinff conditions, which necessitate a determination
that the holding company is engaged in a •’public” business, (l
In a study of the legal status of the utility holding
companies and the basis for federal legislation under the
commerce clause by Jay L, Jackson, (2) it is shown that the
public utility holding company of itself, apart from the con-
trol it exercises over the operating companies so closely
approximates an undertaking whioh may be said to be ”affect-
ed with a public interest" that it may be held to be within
this special category,
4, Public Interest
With r eference to the second view, th«t the public
utility holding company’s existance and management is of de-
cided public interest, we find that the public, according to
Bonbright and Means, (3) is increasing in its demand to bring
the holding company under effective supervision.
Since it is a general principle of law that requires leg-
islation to be in the publi<^ interest, (4) it is necessary to
set forth the reasons why it is of decided public interest to
regulate the holding compsiny in this field,
a. Magnitude
In the first place, justification for the regulation of
holding companies is because of their magnitude, ( 5) It is
claimed that the holding companies dominate the utility
(1) CLAY, op, cit, , p,249
(2) PEDERiOi TRADE COMMISSION, op, cit., N0.73A, , p.218
(3) THE HOLDING COMPANY, op. cit., p.200
(4) DOZIER DE VANE, HEARINGS ON H. R. 5423, op. cit. ,p. 543
(5) PRENDERGAST, op. cit., p,66
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industry with 12 billions (l) invested by 4 to 5 million
people* (2
)
While size is interesting, mere size in business and
in($ustrial concerns is no longer a terror to the public*
The tendency towards combination into large groups may be
defensible and perhaps inevitable from the technical point
of view but it has bee^ a Constance source of irritation in
the relations between the consumer and the public utilities. ( 3)
Great size, however, has its disadvantages arising from
permitting a egroup of* capitalists to exercise a large degree
of arbitrary power over large areas and large numbers of
people* The financial and political influence which such
groups may be able to exercise is unhealthy, especially in re-
gions lackine other economic organizations of equal strength* (4)
b* Concentration of Control
In the second place, they must be regulated because of
their concentration of control* There is a feelino* that this
control gives economic power to a privileged few to control the
investment, the business, and the livelihood of the many* (5)
Not only is this control centered in the utility industry by
means of voting trusts, interlocking directorates and officers,
management contracts and the control of proxies, (6) but it has
spread to other industries to whom the utilities distribute
its enormous business and to the newspapers it allots its
(k) NEW YORK TIICES, CSEPT.27,1936)p*10E. ARTICLE BY HAROLD E.HINTON
(2) BEPRESENTATI7E EICHER, H.R.1318, op. cit* , p*48
(3) NEW YORK TIMES, loc* cib*
(4) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op* cit*, No*72A* ,p*880
(5) CONGRESSIIAN, EICHER, op* cit* ,p*47
(6) NATIONAL POWER POLICY COMMITTEE, op* cit*
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Concentration of control is speeded up by the system
of interlocking directorates; by the retention by small,
inside groups of the voting stocks of holding companies
and by the pyramiding of holding companies one upon the
other. According to Senator V/heeler, (2) "the present
development of electric utility science and mechanics re-
quires no such concentration of control in an essentially
local industry .... .A sound distribution of economic power,
economic responsibility and economic opportunity between
localities and between individuals absolutely requires a
breaking down of that concentration."
Says the federal Trade Commission: "The holding com-
pany in the utility field has been the chief device by which
the control and ownership of operating companies has been
rapidly concentrated in fewer hands with every prospect that
the process will continue on to nation-wide monopoly unless
there be governmental regulation." (3)
c. Investor
According to the "liberal" vie?/, they must also be re-
gulated in the public interest because of the investor. The
securities of the public utility holding companies are sold
to a large number of investors. These investments, both by
private individuals and fiduciaries should, in the greatest
(1) REPRESEIITATIViS EICHER, op. cit. , p.49
(2) COilGRESSIONiOi RECORD, (March 28,1935) p.4774
(3) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSIOJSf , op. cit., No.73A., p.63
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public interest, be as safe, stajjle and non-speculative
as is practical to make such investments*
Accordine to Prendergast, (l) there is nothing essen-
tially wrong with the holding company plan as far as the in-
vestor’s are concerned# The task is to make all utility
holding companies sound, and free from all charges of over-
capitalization and unsound security sales* (2)
However, investments in public utility holding companies
are so widely diffused that millions of American citizens
would be affected by any steps taken toward regulation*
d* Consumer
In the fourth place, the public utility holding com-
pany must be regulated because of the consumer*
Professor Bonbright is one of the many who believes
that the activities of the holding company in the public
utility field are of interest to the rate payer* He does not
agree with the contention that rates are not affected by the
capitalization and management of the holding companies, by
the prices they pay for controlling interests in the subsid-
iaries, and by contracts for management services they make
with subsidiaries* He holds that rates are affected by
these items* He says that the assumption that rates are fix-
ed by an automatic process based on physical valuation are
(1) PUBLIC UTILITIES AND THE PEOPLE, op* cit. , p*93
(2) IBID, p.74
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not supported by facts in most cases. Most rate reduc-
tions, he claims, have been the result of negociation or.
have been voluntary. This being true, he contends, that
the financial needs and charges of the dominating holding
companies do exert unfavorable influence on rates and also
onestension of service facilities, (l)
According to Professor Haney, C2) from the public
point of view, power without responsibility is the great ob-
jection to holding company organization.
In the first place we have seen that the financial
liability of the members of a holding conipany may be only a
fraction of their financial power.
In the second place, they are under no adeqiiate re-
sponsibility for their economic and social power.
B. Survey of Laws
Whatever alleged evils have accompanied the growth of
the holding company in the public utility industry, the fact
is obvious that they were not prevented by that body of State
laws which the utility industry has defended as efficient re-
gulations, according to the Federal Trade Commission. (3)
1. State
a. Extent
In the reports of the Federal Trade Commission(4)
,
it is noted that while twenty-eight states and 3 territorial
possessions have established the right of one corporation to
(1) BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op. cit. ,p.l49
(2) BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND COMBINATION, p.277




J’&o.' .7 Tuu I’.L a.-c .;'i y.(<
.
;i;3 J r.i!
.•VO ;io jljjRLV'T nyo<: ©v-rl
« aaij^Io ...ncicT
V 4.U t T.jjue^ r:ov: t.. , vJViii 3 tii'x • '.'i.r.tviulov fU'.'>'} QVr,ii
.j, i i Jt 1 • 4- 0 ii ri i, ^ 4.'i A i ijr^ob .iiiu lo <• :iiv> .bfuj abeen Oii.’t
no dstntfjl'l'jil qXci' •
. ob ’^oinnqzioc
\ 1 ) *<].<'
t"
t'':‘i:Vl»7V 'lO H ; i - vi' a J
oildiA) j.vJ -ici
.1 i 2v < X oT -nib‘ic-t;u.
" ifo /,:) XlXCfi«noq:v"iJ'') .t;/0 » i W 1D' 'Ot.( j./Sjv iO iiltoq
•> ixoiib^.innji 'io jji.iblo.* o^r :r>iJV)3(,
Mi'/.i; j.'l Oi^.j .'t'ifij QO.'vlq erij nl
.3 yXno od .a.n »ns'/r.ico Xta- .: 'tj
-.-x^cfriiO::: *o
,C-i:c.i»:ni‘- ixox^J' *.o uoiJ’D/i'ix
- j'x Dd ;wp£>bii 01 : '.rt)/'!!;-' 'czn^
^
ronlq bncooa odi iil
.-
.oq X?»£oo£. bn.i 0 ii.-nanoc 9 ^o'x yv- i/.ic'xiinoqo
'
Ic >.QV7/^ " .
''
1') ji^-;or£:B baiilJSqjiJQij^ tv. ii tilXYO lOVSO'iJlLV.
^Oiii yxlw. , ’. /V. t [iuJbnx yjxIiJxj nXi'-'ij.y c .i?" -i.c /nxvqnioo :iiiioXoxi
lo w.bn 1 J e: j- bo.txt.
. 5*x ; jon :? J .-old ai/oivol; ai
-e'i .ti;e i.o n il9 a o i^araslsi) i - a y'i + r.L,.a. OfiJ aoi.i'.T ti 7i d
-
1-'-
-oeiv.u’iolj sli xii. •.a'ij o- :;r. J3-*iooo,*i j snoxd.cIijj5
..};
,
( J‘ ,t iuiiioD aXijtf'S? X-:’X3l'ol oiu^ -o i.j'ioqsT o/vu nl
lx. iacJ i. i'x jvt C Li'ji t.oj j'ngxt-y^i'iJWO' oXxriw boJ-oxi al j1
Qi n..‘l oqv.oo 6H 0 lo oiiJ baao iIJyb\t tia uvna Liioi naooo oq
2.’X« • j.O • sJ I'jjTUlu.'. VklX^ A IliJ *}1GK V .. ( Cy
VVr.:?«l'!0£-,.*x»:i;ji40D ai^'- K0ITi>:5iIllv.D:-^- CidfiHXtll/a (2)
’*- «- .oV-Ox
,
1 o . K(Li>iT X* lilviu.-; 1 id;
“
• q » • « 0''X ; —i. U. Ui { -• }
88
to hold stock in another corporation, in 21 of these 31
jurisdictions, no control whatsoever is provided over the
holding companies organized pursuant to the statiaary pri-
vilege* (l)
Holdinc companies have not been otherwise regulated ex-
cept as to the certification of their issues by so-called
•*blue-sky law authorities'* • But this supervision has not
been of the searching nature which has characterized the
supervision by public service commissions. (2
)
The regulation of the utility industry by the states has
been left chiefly to state commissions* The basis of this
state regulation is the police power as interpreted in the
light of constitutional amendments* (3) At present, every
state has public utilities or public service commissions with
the exception of Delaware* (4)
RegifLation of utilities was at first left largely to
local bodies but since the local utilities gradixally outgrew
their city boundaries and demands were made that the state
supervise their activities* At the outset of which state re-
gulation dates around 1907, the utilities were opposed to it,
and challenged it constitutionally* Failing in that challenge,
they became more and more reconciled to state regulation as
the courts gradually built into it a body of laws which pro-
tected the interest of the utilities*
”fl) federal trade commission, K0.71A. ,p*2
(2) PRERDERGAST, loc* cit*
(3) MUNN vs. ILLIHOIS, op* cit.
(4) LAIDLER, op. cit., p*415
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State reeulation is not a coherent, consistent body
of laws and administrative requirements* There is a wide
difference in the extent and effectiveness of the regulatory
policies of the various states* (l) Eic-ht states have no re-
gulation of electric and gas companies, sixteen have no con-
trol over electric or gas company security issues, twenty-
three h«ve no control of capitalization of assets of operat-
ing companies while in some states having regulatory com-
missions, these commissions are inadequately financed or lack
adequacy of resources in money and experienced and capable
personnel when opposing the more important holding companies* (2)
There are two ways by which a regulating commission may
be given control over a company which holds the stocks of pub-
lic utilities subject to its jurisdiction* (3) The f irst way
is to recognize the holding company itself as a public utility
while the second method is to secure indirect control by sub-
jecting the operating company to various restrictions in its
relation to the holding company*
It was suggested by the National Association of Railroad
and Public Utilities Commissioners, that holding companies
(1) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op* cit*, No*73A.,p.l
(2) IBID, No*72A* ,p*873
(3) BONBRIGHT AHD MEANS, op* cit*, p*201
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siioiild be defined as public utilities* V/here states have
assumed some jurisdiction, it was found to be unsatisfactory.
It is claimed that were they able to classify the holding
companies as utilities, the state commissions would be un-
able to cope with the situation since they have difficulty
in regulating the operating companies.
Up to the present time, at least, the only really sig-
nificant influence which public service commissions have had
over the holding company has been exercised by the power to
regulate the action of the subsidiary operating company. (l)
This takes the form of regulation of secxirity issues (2) and
by re<?tilation of service contracts*
The present law in Massachusetts, (3) which provides
that no foreign corporation owning a majority of stock of
certain utilities can issue stock based on the property of
the domestic utility, unless such issue has been specifically
authorized in Massachusetts is typical of a method to control
the holdiniz: company through its operating company. However,
this provision of the law has been successfully evaded through
the use of the so-called Massachusetts Trust. (4)
The attempt of the Massachusetts legislature to thus con-
trol the holding company is a rare exception to the general
practice* (5) The more usual method is to require that a hold-
ing company first secure the approval of the Public Service
(1) BOHBRIGHT AKD MEANS, p*206
(2) HASH, op. cit*, p*423
(3) ,G.L.C. MASSACHUSETTS, CH.181 sec. 10. see also General
Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Ch*156,sec.5
for domestic corporations*
(4) HASH, loc* cit*
(5) BOHBRIGHT AHD MEAHS, op* cit. ,p.208
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Commission before it can acquire a limited percentage,
usually ten per cent, of the stock of an operating utility*
In general the protection which this provision has given the
public is questionable (l) since corporations by organizing
ten dimimy corporations could and did purchase stock and so
evade the law* (2)
Efforts to regulate holding company management sales
and service contracts have had to encounter almost complete
lack of jurisdiction over the dominating party in such con-
tracts* This regulation has been limited to the regulation
which commissions have had over the opera tins- companies, ex-
cept in a number of States in which legislation has recently
been enacted for the purpose of giving State commissions some
control over the parent or affiliated company*
The officials of the holding company see no necessity
for regulation of contracts since State commissions may refua
to recognize as legitimate operating expenses the fees paid to
holding companies to the extent that they are unreasonable* (3)
Reasonableness of fees is a matter of opinion, however*
c* Adequacy
There are a number of almost inherent abuses
which can not be reached by direct regulation of the operating
companies*
There also are limitations to regul« tion* (4) A
commission under the “guise of regulation" cannot manage the
tl) SENATOR DICKINSOEr, GONGiiESSIOIIAL RECORD, p*9090
(2) HEARINGS ON H* R* 5423, p*236
(3) JONES AND BIGHAM, op* cit*
,
p*604
(4) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op* cit*, No*73A*, p*167
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affairs of an operating company, nor can it set aside arbit-
rarily an transaction or contract with an outside agency
(which may be a holding company in the eyes of the law) nor
can such company be deprived of its constitutional rights.
State commissions, as we have seen, have very
limited powers with respect to regulation of holding compan-
ies. Those who have adopted a thorough-going policy or
system of utility regulation have encountered insuperable
difficulities growing out of constitutional limitations, ec-
onomic developments, and the attitudes of both the industry
and the law courts. (l)
Under our constitutional fom of government each of
the States has the power of issuing corporate charters and de-
termining the conditions under which such corporations may do
business. Our constitutional system precludes the exercise
of jurisdiction by any one State within the territory of any
other State.
The Federal government has jurisdiction over com-
merce among the several states and with foreign nations. Con-
gress has the authority to regulate not only this interstate
and foreign commerce but those transactions which substantial-
ly affect that commerce. The courts have even held that com-
merce which is purely intrastate in character is subject to
regulation if it affects and constitutes an obstacle to the
regulation of interstate commerce. The several states, on
(1) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, p.28 No.73A
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the other hand, have power to control intrastate commerce*
Conflicts of jurisdiction can easily occur in which re-
gulatory authority will he asserted by both the State and
Federal governme’^ts* State regulation can easily be avoid-
ed by a utility through carrying its operations across a
State line, even only to a minor extent as in the case of the
Attleboro Steam and Electric Company* (P. U* R* Commission
of R* I* vs Attleboro Steam and Electric Co*)
The development of holding companies which transcends
the geographical limits of the individual States in which its
operating units are located, necessarily transcends the power
of those States to effectively regulate them, (l) Large capital
must be organized to take advantage of long-distance trans-
mission with the result that ownership and control of the com-
panies leave the state seeking incorporation under more liberal
corporation laws*(^)
Just as local authorities have failed in their task of
regulation because the industry operated beyond their borders,
so the states are bound to fail in the same condition where the
operations of the utilities extend beyond their jurisdiction*
State regulation, also, was effectively held up by the
plea of interstate commerce resulting in a loss of expense and
of time and in humilation to the State* (3) The disposition of
the utilities to seek protection of the Federal courts against
what the considered unwarranted exercise of State regulation
(1) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit*
,
No *72A.p.32
(2) MOSHER AND CRAWFORD, op. cit., p*367
(3) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op* cit., No*73A.p.79
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was stopped by prohibiting the utilities to resort to the
Federal courts in rate cases except where they involve fed-
eral commerce#
Then too, the public buys holding company securities be-
lieving that they are purchasing public utility securities
which are subject to state commissions# When the companies
collapse or the securities fall in value, the entire system of
regulation is looked upon by the public as responsible when in
fact it had no control#
State public; service commission and commissioners have
been keenly aware of * the holding company problem# Being gen-
erally fearful of the encroachment of the Federal Government on
states* rights, they have, as a general rule, not looked with
favor on proposals of Federal regulation of holding companies#
On the contrary, they have sought legislation giving them great-
er power# For the most part, such legislation has not been en-
acted# (l)
Besides the states omitting or being unable to exercise
the function of regulating the holding companies, we find that
they have created or promoted certain evils by pursuing- a pol-
icy of liberality of laws regarding corporate practices# (2)
The unrestricted ownership of stock by one corporation in
(1) PREIIDERGAST, op# cit# , p#81
(2) FEDERAL TRADE COIMISSION, op# cit#, No#73A. p#10
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another which is possihle now under the state laws has had
the effect of c;reating a corporate structure so vast and so
complex as to pass beyond state control* (l) It is interest
ing to note that Delaware, the state which is popular with
holding companies is about the most liberal in its laws* It
does not even have a public service commission, (2
)
Professor Haney says of the state regulation of public
utility holding company:
“Its amphibiousness makes state control
futile; for while it operates under a
state certificate or incorporation and
its units are state corporations, its
business is interstate and beyond con-
trol and by procuring incorporation from
a lax state and forming subsidiaries in
hostile states, the regulations concern-
ing foreign corporations may be evaded in
part*" (3)
2. Interstate Compacts
Interstate compacts have been suggested as a method of
meeting the holding company problem. Such a device is im-
pliedly authorized by the Constitution and has been used to
settle disputes between states and provide coordinated action
by several states* A recent example is the Colorado River
compact, which is an agreement be affected states for an ap-
portionment of river waters in connection with the building of
Boulder Dam by the Government* The compact did not concern
the regulation of the generation and transmission of electric
energy at the dam*
(1) BEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op* cit*, No*73A,, p.lO
(2) LAIDLER, op* cit*, p*415
(3) BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND COMBINATION, p*277
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The requirement that Congress consent to such a com-
pact insures a degree o'f* supervision by the National govern-
ment -while the actual methods of control are determined by
the several states who are parties to the negotiation. Con-
«
ferences looking toward such a compact to regulate the light
and power industry common to the states of New York, New Jer-
sey and Pennsylvania, were held in 1925, but no agreement ?/as
reached. Congress has given its consent to 60 compacts aid
none has yet been invalidated by the United States Supreme
Court, (l)
The advantages of legislating by means of interstate
compacts is found in the fact that there is no danger of im-
posing on states regulations determined by other states hav-
ing no direct concern nor imtimate knowledge of conditions.
States need not necessarily be contiguous to enter into com-
pacts.
The possibilities of this device as a method of pro-
viding regional regulation have been outlined by Frankfurter
and Landis. (2) However this method is not feasible where con-
solidations have been indiscriminate and only occasionally
accompanied by physical interconnections. None of the larger
systems whose far-flung activities have created the necessity
for additional regulation is limited to a single region.
(1) CHRISTIAN SGI3NCE MONITOR, Nov. 21,1936
(2) I HAVE POUND MANY REFERENCES TO BUT HAVE NOT EXAMINED
FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE COMPACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL 685, 1925.
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Enthusiasts for greater intervention by the govern-
ment in the field of public utility regulation are inclined
to ignore the fact that our Federal system of laws is one of
delegated powers* Under the Constitution all powers not de-
legated to the Hational government are expressly reserved to
the States* (l)
a* Constitutional Aspects
According to the traditional interpretations of
the distribution of powers between the State a^^d Federal Gov-
ernments, mere inadeqiiacy or ineffectiveness of State control
does not clothe the Federal government with authority to act*
Such authority flows from powers expressly granted in the Fed-
eral Constitution*
Since one effective way of meeting the holding com-
pany problems is to have state regulation supplemented by Fed-
eral regulation, (2 ) it is pertinent to inquire into the legal
aspects of Federal regulation*
There are three general powers conferred upon the
Federal Government by the constitution under which may be
classified the bxfLk of Federal legislation designed to re-
gulate during normal times, business relations and economic
conditions* (3) They are the pov/ers to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce, the power to impose taxes, and the
power to operate the postal system as a monopoly*
(1) CLAY, op* cit*
,
p.l40
(2) PREHDERGAST, op. cit*, p.96
(3) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit., No*73A., p.34
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1. Interstate Commerce
The Federal power to regulate commerce was the unifyina
factor which has made possible the creation of the Federal
government and a complete freedom of trade among the states*
It is the power called upon most extensively in framine re-
giAlatory statutes*
Congress may prescribe the conditions under which cor-
porations can do business in interstate commerce and can re-
quire the dissolution or divestment o'f' property where reason-
ably necessarj'^ to bring about desired conditions in this
field*(l)
This interstate business can be applied to the holding
comoany in two ways;- either through the transportation of
energy from one state to another or through the sale of sec-
urities in interstate commerce*
It has been coontended that holding companies are not en-
gaged in interstate commerce and therefore are not subject to
regulation by th^:^ Federal government* (2) On the other hand,
the Federal Trade Commission cites fifty-nine court cases
since 1891 in which gas and electric utility companies have
challenged and delayed, frustrated or defeated state regulation
by setting up the defense of being engaged in interstate com-
merce*
It has been held that ownership of stock of a corporaticn
in another state and the use of the mails for transactions of
business do not constitute interstate commerce* There is also
(1) MEMORaKDUM IN SUPPORT OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HOLDING
COMPANY BILL, lo«* cit*
(2) PBET^ERGAST, op* cit*, p*97
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some doubt as to whether the sale of securities from one
state to another is interstate commerce. (l) However Con-
gress has already asserted its jurisdiction over security
distribution in passing the Securities Aet of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Commission Act of 1934.
2. Taxes
The Federal power to levy taxes is a broad power. The
express limitation to this power is in the constitution while
the implied limitations are those implied by the dual nature
of the American system of government and those of the Fifth
Amendment.
Since taxes may be imposed as a method of policy as well
as a regulatory measure, (2) the Federal Trade Commission re-
commended six tax proposals to regulate holding companies. (3)
Taxes may take the form of privilege, property or income
taxes and may be aimed either at the companies themselves or
the purchaser of their securities. Constitutional problems
encountered are questions of directness, uniformity and class-
ifications. (4^
The recent elimination of consolidated tax returns which
have encouraged the development of corporate superstructure (5)
will have an effect on the holding company. The simplicity
of corporate structure due to tax burdens has become a well-
defined tendency. Wall Street traces the vogue to the
(1) NASH, loc. cit.
^
(2) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. c;it. ,No.73A. p.l91
(3) IBID, p.68
(4) LEGAL STUDY ON TAXATION AS A MEANS OF REGULATING HOLDING
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aunendine of the income tax laws in 1934 which abolished
consolidated returns and required separate statements for
each unit in the corporate group, except railroads. Pressure
for simplification was increased by making intercorporate
dividends partly taxable and by the lowering of exemptions
on dividends received by one unit from another under the
Revenue Act of 1936. Co'nporat ions were freed from the cap-
ital gains tax in shifting properties from one unit to an-
other as was suggested to help the disintegration of the ob-
jectionable holding company system by encouragement through
tax exempting the issuance of exchange of securities incident
to an equitable distribution of equities among the security
holders ef existing corporations. (l)
3. Postal System
Gonerress may restrict the use of the mails in the public
interests. This is a powerful weapon and is limited only by
the general limitations and prohibitions of the Constitution.
It must not deny due process of law, abridge freedom of speech
or make unreasonable searches and seizures.
Cone-ress obtains its authority to reeulate the postal sys-
tem. under its power to establish post offices and post roads.
The interest of the government is both proprietary and regulatory,
thus the power of Congreee is even more comprehensive than that
over interstate commerce. (2)
(1) REPORT OP COMMITTEE ON THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING
company bill of the business advisory council for the
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, APRIL 30,1935, also, WALTER M.W.
SPLAWN, SPECIAL COUNSEL OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMIjIERCE, IN HOUSE REPORT NO. 827, Part 2.,P.VIII.
(2) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF HOLDING COMPANY BILL.loc. cit.
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b. Federal Incorporation
One method that the federal governmei^t through Congress
might employ to regulate holding companies in interstate com-
merce is by means of federal incorporation. (l)
In the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, bills were
introduced into Congress to provide for federal incorporation
or licensing of corporations in interstate commerce*
At first, the objective stressed was the breaking up or
the regulation of monopoly aind monopolistic tendencies in
business* Then leaders in industry became interested in the
advantage of uniformity and relief from conflicting jurisdic-
tions*
President Taft in his message of 1910 recommended a fed-
eral incorporation law and a bill known as the Taf t-flfriekersham
Act was drawn* (2) President Wilson in his message of 1919 and
1920, revived the recommendation of Federal licensing*
The Federal Trade Commission suggested som#^thing of the
sort for the controlling of the Public Utility Holding Com-
panies* (3) The National Recovery Administration proposed it as
a means of enforcing labor standards, collective bargaining
and unfair competition* The China Trade Act of 1922 included
a federal incorporation plan.
The President of the New York Stock Exchange has publicly
gone on record in favor of a Federal law governing the incor-
i>oration of companies. (4 ) The American Federation of Labor has




(2) FE3)ERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit., No.73A. , p.43
(3) IBID, COMPILATIONS 0F PROPOSALS AND VIEWS FOR AND fiGAINST
FEDERAL INCORPORATION. OR LIBENSING OF CORPORATIONS , op . cit.No . 69A
(4) STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICE HEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING AND CURRECNY, Pt.15, p*6637
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supported the Federal Licensing of corporations in interstate
commerce for the third time in recent conventions. (l)
The Constitution of the United States does not give Con-
gress direct authority to' create corporations, but it may
create corporations for the purpose of carrying out these pow-
ers expressly granted to it. (2) There are three types of leg-
islation:!) Voluntary federal incorporation, 2) Compulsory fed-
eral incorporation, 3) Federal licensing of state-chartered cor-
porations engaged in interstate commerce.
Objections to any or all have been raised in the gravest
terms and by lawyers and statesmen whose names rank with those
of the proponents. Of first magnitude is the fear expressed
concerning concentration of power in the Federal Government.
Other questions have been raised. Cotild the Federal gov-
ernment, granting its power over interstate commerce, issue a
charter for corporations which have been held to be local under-
takings subject to state jurisdictions? If the federal charter-
ing power should surmount the many difficulties, would it not be
taking away the authority of the states to tax the franchise and
the property of the corporations and so deprive the states of a
large and even vital share of their revenue? (3)
Among the conditions which Congress might impose in the
granting of the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce,
as a corporation is a complete prohibition against ownership of
(1) CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, (November 23,1936) Volume XXVIII
No. 36, P.l.
(2) ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK, op. cit. , p.20
(3) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, op. cit., No.73A.,p.45
ni: cnoi>t jcioq,xoc! Ic ijfiian^oJia. XeTsbo'i sdi' JboJ-'ioqqjja
{X . nsvaoc; iafosx n.c siaiX b^.tds siii xol oo'isnuaor
-a„'0 ©vXii, vOn £j9oJb iiiXiiiU fttiX "io no i- xJcnoD o/iT
y;m Xi Xwrf ,cf:ciJ*:xoq;xoo 5>:J’jsoxd 'oX YXXiorlXue Xoaxib ce9X£
-wov-j ©neilX ^ijo .iUt'^'XTi^o "to oftoqxuq otiX xol: an j /J ii'ioq'ioo sX«exo
-sol "ib ceqv.X aoxriJ »xxi axoaT (S).*i oX
-.'3o'i \;ioali/qiao0
,
noiXsxoqxoon t ^I'lsXrtwIaV (IinoXX^Isi
-XOO JboX0*tXfillC-f?Xj3X8 'to rniSdei: tX X*;taX>o^ {c, ,«ioiXBxoqxooax Xsxd
.©oii-.;3xaoG oXjaXaxoXni nX fossBSiio enoix.xixoq
jgcvxj'-:} sidi ai ac’^tX avail II" xo oX cnoxXo&t*^^
oeoaX xiXiw itnex eoniXiii ar&oiiy: risffiedX . Xa i>na axo^JSl \:<i i)n£ anrxoX
b&s.i£e’X.iJ^& x/ialt cuts cl aftaXias-em Xexx'X '10 .clsiono-o'zq ©lix lo
. Jn9ir4:X;3Yo€ IsrLcae'^ ailX ni xawoq lo noiXav-Xaeonoo
-V03 oriX X>IjjoO noec ovsft anoxXeenp n:ailXO
j3 f3Jj*::jCii' 5 00iar:auoo eXjaXsaaXni levo 1^Koq rXx sniXaeTca^ ,Xnsrrjrxa
-'iOJbna I^:ii>ol ad oX Jblari naocf avari liciuw enoija'ioqioo *iol leXtarlo
"leXiijflo Iniaiiol: ©iU IX 5'8noiXo L&Gi'xnt oX*iXo cX lootdve B^ni^Bd
fid loa Jt bXjsow , aaiXInOi'i'iiJb ' as-a ©dc Xn/JO^wns Muone 'iswoq gMi
Jbn^ aairionn'il sclX .x.«X oX t;aXi»XB 9ilx vXiiorlX.'Jx^ edX anx^taX
a -0 B'i?XaXR Oili svlttqelD oa X>fui fenoxXa9:oqioo ©aX 'io T^Xioqoiq ©liX
(S) t9tmdV9T 'ixi.iiX to exaiie laXir xi^yg ijna ©B'i-eI
onX ni oeoqJttt XUg,iiu aeoTi^jiioO xbiriw saoxXxnnoo snX ' nonA
^
©o't'ftinnioo sXiiJ cti wX ii c xti ^nxsasno to ©3©Itvx’tq ©riX "io si'-’^ximis
io t, xilsion^ro Xsnxasa noxxiditloiq eifalqaoc a ni noxXaioqnoo a aa
mw ©aujXoV (B6«X,5: 'ledx^a^ vol?) , «0*riW0i£ XC/lEIOe liAI'reiiJHO (i;
.1.^ ,3C.oK
< 02, q ,...0 .*: riOOaa^uJi- a'TKATlOJOOOrfw {s
Cf"
.q, . oZ ,.iXo .go , HttiiUO aOj'i^T X-ia.iiGS’^. (£ !,I
103r
stock in another corporation, (l) In the case of corpor-
ations organized in the District of ColiAmbia, which are
created by Federal authority, Congress has adhered to the
common law rule where stock ownership is unknown.
,
c. Extent
The Federal Power Commission Act of 1920 creates a com-
mission empowered to license private organizations and muni-
cipalities to develop, trajismit and utilize power from govern-
ment property, where the Federal government has the natural
rights of a proprietor or sovereign. It was en«cted as a con-
servative measure rather than one complementary to s tate reg-
ulation.
In 1931, the Federal Power Commission voted to study the
subject of holding company control of its licenses. The re-
port was released in 1932 and is siammarized as follows with
regard to holding companies:
-
1. Public control of holding companies in the power
field is absolutely essential in the public interest and
should include supervision of contracts, regulation of the
issuance of securities and regulation uniformity and publicity
of accounts.
2. Data discloses dominance of holding companies in pro-
jects licensed under the Federal Power Act and the inadequacy
of books of the licensees themselves for complete determination
of costs, reserves etc. A similar situation applies to the
(1
]
"iffiMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HOLDING
COMFAM- BILL, loc. cit.
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Commissions jurisdiction over companies engaged in inter-
state transmission and companies not regulated by state coom-
missions where acontrolled by holding companies*
3. Of the major licensed projects, 1103 on June 30,1932,
48 were controlled by 10 holding companies whose system serv-
ed a population of more than 42 million* A community of in-
terest between these ten g roups was shown by the fact that 19
directors were directors or officers in more than one group* (l)
2* Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and
Exchange Commission Act of 1934
An indirect and limited form of Federal regulations has
resulted from the incidental inclusion of utilities under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Act of 1934* They aet up certain methods of regulat-
ing interstate commerce in corporate securities for the pur-
pose of protecting the investor against fraudulent misrepresent-
ation in his purchase of securities and against manipulation of
the security market to his detriment*
V/hile it seeks to protect the investor from fraud and de-
ceit, it does not protect the rate payer nor substitute Com-
mission judgement for investor’s and enterprisers* judgement
regarding \inderlying values of property, investment advantage
and risks of capital investments* (2)
Fraud is illegal, but not all illegality is fraud* The
securities act does not provide standards by which legality of
operations may be determined* The illegality of proposed cor-
porate projects and their effects on investments, competition
(1) HOLDING COMPANY CONTROL OF LICENSES OF FEDERiO* POTOR
COMMISSION, P, VII I,
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and interstate commerce will be seldom, if ever, be made
apparent on the face of the registration statement, thus
making for little, if any, effect on the present unrestrain-
ed ability of the holding company to operate to the detriment
of the investor. (l)
3. Public Utility Act of 1955
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 provides
for the regiilation of holding companies in the electricity
and gas business by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
which may ultimately order the dissolution of needlessly com-
plex set-ups. By this act, public utility holding companies
beyond the second degree will be illegal after January 1,1938,
except closely integrated groups operating in one state or ad-
joining states (New England Power Association, for example)
or extending into Canada or Mexico, may continue a three-layer
structure, if the Securities Exchange Commission finds that
such companies operate more efficiently under that set-up, and
if the system does not become unweildly for effective local
control.
The Act further provides that interstate operations of
power companies shall be put under Federal regulation at once.
Such companies must register with the Federal Power Commission,
created by the Aotj on October first,1935 and those not so
registering will be barred from the mails. The Commission is
given authority to supervise rates, acco\mting and property
acquisitions.
(l) FEDERAL TRADE COMl-ilSSION, op. ait.. No .73A.,p.2l4
oiii ui 9cf iievsf i x si^otXeis ©c* Iltw ©o-somtuoo ©d’jojaidcfni irt©
,
3n9H!»d^j3^ B ac icJxiTJ^G X8©"i eit^ 1o ©o©l oiU no
-atjaiJ aoxnu ittioa^'iq odS no 'iX 70I ^\niiiiin







v;^ X J. x&XJ vlldir^ -o
\
ee>-l:>ivo!rq oCQL "io ^oa Y.xi&i*iol^>. s^ifcXoK f^ildlini ©til
Yd’icXi^oeXst od^ ni cainBqmoo ^nXJ&Iotl lo aoi.t jsXu s;©t ©tit tol
t noiecXtronoO agrLeriaxii hxa. aatiiiwoeS ailJ caeniawd bus
-Hoo iiGi^xjIcaeiJb eiid 'xaJb’to doiLta.-
QQlasqmon gxitfolori Yj-^XXd'i; >'iXdix- 8txU .agu-j-es. reXq
t8ot?X,I XB^oIXi od IIXw &e‘i^db biicc&a add bx'iox^d
- 10 ed©d« 9H0 ni gnid^iago 8CTL-gT8 Z)od©'^eJn£ ^XseoXo dgaojc®
(aXqi6-«;x9" lol ,ixoid©iooaBA 'lawcvX brusS^nZ woK) aei^da gnxniot
ie\i>iX~9©ttfid © ©xicidnoo x-’^^ ^bclxoZ -10 ©JbsrtsO odni 8nii>ni»dx© 10
djtfdd abnil noxeeitainoO 98fu*^ricx£ 8eXdiiuo6ci arid "ii , awdoj/ids
l>iu3
,
jo-w©e d Rile)’ loJbrm YXdnaXoilla aioui ©dBisqo SDinsqir:oo daua
XsooX evidoella 70I xlhX.to'i^'WJ ©sioood doa aoob maJ^ex^ odd li
« Coidnoo
lo anoXdAToqo ©disda^adox darid tieaxroiq ledd'ixr't doA odT
. joao da noidaXt;33tt X©iai)o^ ^obi:o dnq ocf XJxdc eaxasgmoo *i©woq
noXas itnmoX) 'lowoX XB'xal'®^ add ddii: Tsdsis©'^’ dRUta Ralfteqmoo dou8
oc don ©aodd bns C£9Xt dendl *radodc!0 no ^dcA odd x^ X'RdseiD
KX xtoiaHi;iiiiicy ©d“ .?sXXjen ©dd moil Xediao' ed XXiw 8nli©dala©T
'cdaoqoicr Jbn© taed£*i ©axvToqxfa od xidTis
.snoidxaXi/po©










The Seciirities Exchange Commission is charged with the
responsibility of eliminatine holding units which are out-
lawed by this Act and of supervising securities issues by
holding companies and their subsidiaries* To this end,
electric and gas companies are required to disclose their cor-
porate structure fully and fairly* Dividend, proxies, inter-
company loans, contracts, utility assets and other interests
are to be submitted to the commission*
The Wheels r-Rayburn Act has an important bearing on in-
terstate utilities, since the size and geographical extent of
systems under holding companies are subject to it*
In its effort to break up large “economic empires'*, the
government has “sentenced to death“ utility holding companies
with scattered holdings* The final act is not the severe ab-
solute death sentence origina.lly put forward by the President*
Much is left to the discretion of the Securities Exchange
Commission* “Five men will decide to what extent the public
interest requires the dismantling of corporate structures built
with millions of dollars invested by millions of people *o*The
holding company could be obliterated and still the electric
power business would go on***It is a major move in the cam-
paign for federal control of business” comments the United
States Chamber of Commerce* (l)
(l) UATIOHS BUSINESS (October 1935) p*2l
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The favorite argument used against this legislation
was to the effect that the proposed hill would destroy values
and thereby ruin "widows and orphans" •(!) Here is what
happened, according to Mr. Kennedy (2). On December 31,1934,
before the bill was introduced, the average of the sixteen
largest utility holding company stocks was 8.16 • On February
6.1935, when the bill was introduced, the index was 7 •13. On
March 12,1935, when the President sent his message on the bill
to Congress, the average had fallen to 5*70, but on August
26.1935, the bill became law, this average had risen to
12.22 and it now stands at about 20. For the same periods,
the average of the nine largest operating utility companies*
stocks was 44.86, 45.49, 46.35, 88.54(3).
On November 7,1936, Federal Judge William C. Coleman
held the act unconstitutional, accusing Congress of flagrant
violation of its powers under the Constitution. (4 ) The opihion
found three separate directions in which Con^^ress had exceeded
its authority. First, the "commerce clause** of the Consti-
tution was violated in that application of the act could not
be restricted to companies operating only in interstate commerce.
Secondly, there was an invalid use of the postal power in deny-
ing the use of the mails to companies not co-operating under
the act. Thirdly, it was held that Congress violated the re -
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quirements of the *due process of law** under the fifth con-
stitutional amendment in that many provisions of the a ct are
arbitrary.
Regardless of whether the supreme court sustains the
much debated Public Utility Holding Company Act, the United
States is going to have federal regulation of public utilit-
ies. The issue is what kind of regulation there shall be
of interstate transactions in gas and electricity, and gas
and electric company finances.
The public service committee of the Investment Bankers
Association said in its annual report in October, 1935,
“Whatever the final decision may be, the Public Utility Act
marks not an end, but a beginning. .of federal regulation
within proper legal limits”. (l) Wendell L. Wilkie, Presi-
dent of the Commonwealth & Southern Corporation, appeared be-
fore the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce in April ,1935
and outlined a long list of regulatory recommendations which
he proposed in preference to the measure subsequently passed
by Congress.
The arrival of this federal regulation is significant in
many ways. It has a social sifirnificance in the protection of
the pocket-book of the consumer and the future investor. What
it may do to the past investor who owns holding company stock
(l) iJEWS ITEM, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, January 22,1936
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is a matter of divided opinions. It has governmental sig-
nificance, raisinc the question whether its greater effect
will be to protect the states in their contests with the
companies or to invade the states and break down their sys-
tems of regulation. It has economic significance, for
especially if the "death sentence" section against utility
holding companies should be upheld, there are those who anti-
cipate that the next step of the Roosevelt Administration
would be to attempt similarly to break up large industrial
holding companies.
II. Competition
The holding company problem and the public ownership
issue are related. The contest today over the future dis-
position of the electric utility industry is between re-
gulation chiefly by state commissions with supplementary re-
gulation by Federal bodies and publin ownership. (l) Since
public ownership is a problem in itself, I will touch brief-
ly its effect on the holding company in the utility field.
A. Local
Public ownership of utility plants offers competition
to the holding company through the local utility plants. The
value of holding company obligations are based on the earning
value of the operating companies and public confidence.
In August, 1936, the Federal Power Commission reported
( 1 ) PRENDERGAST , op • cit. , p.313
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that publicly owned utility plants are increasing and that
the number of privately owned units is decreasing by approx-
imately the same degree# The trend toward public ownership,
small thou^ it may be, has alarmed and continues to alarm
investors in and managers of commercial utility plants(l)
The Federal government through the Public Works Ad-
ministration can and goes give government money to muni-
cipalities to build competitive plants, thus affecting the
holding company indirectly by duplicating existing private
power facilities • (2
)
B. Sectional and National
1, Tennessee Valiev Authority
In an attempt to regulate utilities by com-
petition, there has been written into the power policy of the
Tennessee Valley Authority the idea of a ’’yardstick* by which
to measure the fairness of public utility rates and financial
practices# (3)
The T. V. A# is a federal corporation created by
an act of Congress on May 18,1933 (4) and bolstered by amend-
ments in 1935 with all the powers of the holding company. The
act definitely puts the government into the business of rend-
ing electric service# The Authority is required to acquire
(1) mfl ¥0RK TIMES, loc# cit#
(2) NATION’S BUSINESS, (July 1936) p#23
(3) BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE TENNESSEE VALLEY, David
E# Lilienthal# He is also author of several well-known
authorative articles on the holding company. See
Lilienthal. The Regulation of Public Utility Holding
Company, 29 Columbia Law Review(l929) and Recent Develop-
ments in the Law of Public Utility Holding Companies
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a market and set up an area in which to conduct its op-
eration of business*
Under the terms of the act creatine the authority,
preference in the sale of s;irplus power is to be given to
**States, counties, municipalities and co-operative organ-
izations of citizens or farmers not organized or doing busi-
ness for profit”. This clause has led directly to P. W. A.
grants for municipal plants in the valley region* (l)
It is claimed that the T* V* A* will remove the poten-
tial dangers and disadvantages of public ownership, a thought
that the utilities and the holding companies in this field are
fighting*
The legal objection to the T* V* A* by the utilities,
boils down solely to the question of whether its primary pur-
pose is the sale of electricity rather than navigation and
whether this is a/' implied constitutional power of the United
States* (2
)
The economic objection to T* V* A* by the utilities boils
down almost completely to the question of whether the power is
fairly priced or whether it is subsidized by Pederal tax-pay-
ers* (3)
There appears to be no doubt on anybody’s part that the
T* V* A* can take business away from the private companies as
(1) NEW YORK TIMES, February 23,1936
(2) ,CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, August 28,1936, p*13
(3) IBID
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fast as it wants to on a purely conpetitive rate basis* (l)
In the opinion of Commissioner Seavey,(2) the creation
of the T* V* A. has made it easier for the public service
commission of the States to adjust rates to afford the pub-
lic large savings in the last two years* (3) Wendell L*
Wilkie, President of the Commonwealth and Southern Company,
claims the T* V. A* competition has had the effect of re-
tarding the private electrical enterprise in the district
as shown by a decrease in the 1937 operating budget and an
inability to refund securities* (4)
2* Affiliate
An agency affiliated with the T* 7* A* is the
I
Electric Home and Farm Authority created by an .executive
order December 19,1933, incorporated in Delaware January 17,
1934 by the directors of the T* V* A* and re-incorporated in
the District of Columbia to do a " chattel-mortgage-loan-busi-
ness'* • Its purpose was primarily to finance the installmert
buying, and to buy, sell and deal in electrical appliances* (5
)
Its life is seven years*
(1) CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, August 28,1936, p*13
(2) CLYDE E. SEAVEY of the SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Address^ before Public Utility Section of the American
Bar Association, Boston, August 25,1936 as reported
in Boston Post. Aiie-ust 26,1936
(3) NEW YORK TIMES (January 3,1937) p*F*l.
(4) IBID
(5) CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 27,1935, p/l0738
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The Tennessee Valley Associated Co-operatives, Inc., was
incorporated in the State of Tennessee hy the three directors
of the T. V. A. for the purpose of promoting and financing
co-operative enterprise and industry in the Tennessee Valley
region. It has perpetup-l existance and its capital,
$300,000, was a present from the ?. E. R. A.
3* Rural Electrification Administration
The R. E. A. - the Rural Electrification Admin-
instration was created by executive order to promote by loans
and otherwise the generation and distribution of electric
energy in rural areas. Its capital is $100,000,000.
The R. S. A. can affect the holding company indirect-
ly thru the subsidiary in that the aid of this organization is
available only in regions where the public utility rates are
within limits set by the Authority
• (l)
In fact, it can lend government money to build com-




The R. E. A. has a “baby brother", the Electric
Home and Farm Authority ^shich takes up the electric flinancing
where the R. E. A. leaves off.
G. Regulation or Ownership
There are four ways by which government ownership of power
facilities might come in the United States, thus eliminating
(1)
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the public utility holding company. First the success of
the Tennessee Valley Authority; secondly, political manip-
ulations, thirdly, public ownership through strict regulation;
and lastly, public ownership through weak Federal legislation.
Public ownership may come if the Tennessee Valley
Authority and similar enterprises should succeed on their
merit and so sell the idea of public operation to the rest of
the country* The Tennessee Valley Authority may succeed only
politically by juggling costs, concealing subsidies, building
up bureaucracies and buying votes with low rates at tax-payers
expense
•
Public ownership may come if federal regulation through
the Securities Commission, Federal Pov/er Commission and Fed-
eral Communication Commission and others should turn by subtle
and perhaps unconscious stages into virtual and actual manage-
ment of the utilities* Federal regulation, on the other
hand, may be so weak and so homstrung as to prove ineffective
and thereby persuade the nation that the only way to protect
themselves against abuses is to ov/n the utilities*
Frank D* Comerford believes:
'*that the relations between the utilities
and the regulatory bodies, both federal
and state, will improve* The utilities
are beginning to realize that many of the
policies on which the federal govern-
ment has embarked, notably the scrutin-
izing of security issues, the -move toward
simplification ofi corporate structures
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and encourageiiient to economical in-
tegrating of po^er systems, are sound.
The goTemment will realize th«t the
interests of consumers will be better
served by co-ordination of existing
facilities, whether privately or pub-
licly ov/ned» and not by wasteful dup-
lication and a punitive campaign to-
v;ard th^ private companies.” (l)
ri)—pRESIDEUT, EDISOK ELECTRIC ILLUMIl^ATING COKPANY OE
BOSTON, AND CHAIRMAN, NEW ENGLAND POV/SR ASSOCIATION,
in an article in the BOSTON HERALD (January 1,1937)
pg*31 and 34
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The publifi utility holding company is a holdine com-
pany organized imder state l«ws to control companies en-
gaged in the public utility industry. The holding com-
pany, originally defined as a corporation organized to
hold stock of another or other companies, is now defined
as a company which by ownership of stock, controls other
companies for management and financial reasons.
A study of the nature and history of the holding com-
pany and its significance in the utility field raises the
question of whether or not some other type of corporate
combination could have functioned as economically in this
field. This question is naturally a matter of opinion and
a weighinfi- of the advantages and disadvantages from many
viewpoints
.
There are those who believe that the public utility
holding company is a convenient means of financing, diver-
sifying risks and conducting large-scale business under the
various laws of 48 s tates and abroad. There are those who
feel that this device is an instrument for manipulating and
concentrating power and wealth on a large-scale to the de-
triment of the public, both investor and consumer.
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Holding company control and management of public util-
ity holding companies has resulted in developments to the
advantage of the operating company, the investor, and the
consumer. Holding company control has also resulted in
developments detrimental to the interests of the operating
company, the consumer, the investor, and the social policy.
The abuses and the vices that have been created or fostered
by this corporate device have cast serious reflection on
the history and the objectives of the holding company.
It must be kept in mind that while in our economic
organization we rely mainly on private initiative to carry
on the operations of industry and commerce, we can resort
to government intervention in the form of prohibition or
regulation of any industry or organization of industry
which fails to function properly. Fundamentally, the right
of a corporation to own stock representing shares of owner-
ship in another corporation is a privilege granted by the
sovereign power which can revoke the privilege at its will.
Should the states revoke this privilege? Most people
will agree that despite the evils and abuses that have
crept in, the holding company in the utility field is fun-
damentally sound. If this form of business organization
is sanctioned economically, steps must be taken to eliminate
the shortcomings. This takes the form of regulation.
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By what means and how far should the public utility
holding company be regulated? I have pointed out that the
utility holding company is now subject to regulation be-
cause it bears a relationship with the corporation prob-
lem, the trust movement and the utility problem.
The holding company in the public utility field is
subject to regulation in the respect that all corporations
are subject to both state and federal laws which govern
their activities. This class of holding companies are
subject to the same restrictions that apply to all cor-
porations, and have the same problems which rise from the
granting of the privilege of limited liability and trans-
ferability of ownership. In addition, as was pointed out,
they have the privilege of stock ownership and control.
Any change in the law for all corporations would af-
fect the holding company on the same basis that any cor-
poration would be subject to changed regulations. The
tightening of corporate regulation would naturally not
cover all of the abuses and evils found in the utility
holding company, but it is felt that if the separate state
corporation practices and laws v/ere revised, it would be a
step in the right direction. However, with the diverse
laws of forty-eight states, there is hope of small prog-
ress for the regulation of the holding company in the
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public utility field through the corporation.
Nevertheless, as in the past, the companies v/ere en-
couraged through the possibility of consolidated tax re-
turns to consolidate into holding companies; so now, a
revision of the tax laws with regard to consolidation
has discouraged the existence of the holding company.
Federal regulation of corporate practice has gone a long
way to limit the practices of the holding company as can
be seen by the indirect and limited form of federal reg-
ulation of interstate commerce in corporate securities by
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission Act of 1934.
In other words, we may expect slow progress through
the state laws and greater progress through the efforts of
the Federal Government notwithstanding all that has been
said against interference with business.
The public utility company is subject to regulation
as a part of the ’’trust problem” --using the term to mean
the problem of ”big business.” Much legislation is directed
against large organizations and any well-defined movement
against the larger businesses would affect the holding com-
pany. -However, big business is on the alert and will ob-
ject strenuously against being singled out as the object of
special legislation.
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The holding company in this field may be regulated as
a part of the trust problem—the term now used in the sense
of the aggregation of capital towards monopoly and illegal
economic ends. However, in the past, the tendency is not
to consider it as a part of this movement because this
class of holding companies is not subject to competition
to a great extent and bears directly on an industry where
monopoly is encouraged. However, it has a bearing on a
competitive field—the financing business—and in the
past, we have seen instances where there has been competi-
tion to gain control of units in a holding company system.
The public utility holding company also differs from
the holding company in the industrial field since the lat-
ter cannot add to its earning power by corporate devices
and because there is lack of opportunity for vertical in-
tegration in the former group.
These three differences show the necessity for treating
the utility holding company separate from the industrials.
Even within the holding companies affecting those industries
which are termed, "public utilities," we find a differentia-
tion, Strictly speaking, railroads and communication com-
panies are public utilities; still, because they are subject
to regulation by both state and federal authorities to a
greater extent, and because they concern industry of national
scope rather than that of local character, we exempt their
holding companies from inclusion in the term, "public util-
ity holding company,"
3i) i>d
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The public utility holding company, in the past, has
been regulated as a part of the utility problem. As has
been pointed out, there are two views with regard to the
utility holding company being a public utility. One view
is that the holding company in this field is not a public
utility legally and economically and is therefore not a
part of the utility problem; while the second view is that
the holding company bears so great a relationship that
effective regulation of the "utilities” necessitates con-
trol of the holding company.
However, the "amphibiousness” of the public utility
holding company, the diverse state laws, the conflict be-
tween federal and state rights, and the issue of public
ownership have tended to defeat effective regulation.
Therefore, many people feel that in order to save
the economically sound public utility holding company, it
is necessary to have special legislation to control this
form of business organization in the public interest.
They feel that the evils and abuses must be guarded
against in the future because of the magnitude of the util-
ity industry, the degree of concentration of control, the
investor, and the consumer.
It is the belief of many that the public utility hold-
ing company can be regulated properly neither by the in-
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poration of public utility holding companies has not received
public sanction. The demand for regulation other than by the
individual or groups of states has resulted in a federal law
providing for the gradual elimination of the powerful and un-
wieldy set-ups of holding company groups, now too powerful
to be properly regulated.
Not only is this legislation aimed at this specific type
of holding company, but we do also find that this type of
holding company is affected by other legislation which is
designed to simplify the corporate structure of all holding
company groups by consolidation of various units because of
the abolishment of consolidated income tax returns, and because
of tax provisions on intercorporate dividends.
This simplification is also encouraged by exemption from
the capital gains tax In shifting from one property to another
in reorganizations.
The possibility of refinancing old debts at lower inter-
est charges, and amendments to state corporation laws have al-
so been factors in the elimination of units in the holding
company structure.
Not only do we have this political interference with the
holding company in the utility field, but we also have eco-
nomic interference because of the relationship with the power
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of its individual units, the competition of the city and
federal governments with the local companies, in the mat-
ter of power, has affected it greatly.
The efforts of the national government has resulted in
a tangle of litigation involving the use of Federal funds
to finance municipal power plants, the Tennessee Valley
Authority, and the Holding Company Act, calling for whole-
sale geographical simplification and integration of prop-
erties. The outcome of this hitter struggle is awaited,
for should the government be successful, it would endeavor
to bring the holding company in the industrial field under
its control.
We can, therefore, come to the conclusion that the
holding company in the utility field is a problem arising
out of the privilege given to the corporation to own shares
of ownership in another company. This problem is a part of
and interrelated with the corporation problem, the trust
movement, the power issue, and public ownership. Neverthe-
less, it is worthy of study and recognition as a problem
separate from the others, not part of the utility problem,
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